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This dissertation studies how the affiliation between different entities in securitization process make 
different market outcomes, and how this estimation of affiliation effects is susceptible to limitations 
in securitized residential mortgage data. Three essays constitute the dissertation. 
The first essay illustrates the limitations and potential bias in the loan-level trustee data. Substantial 
amounts of loan attributes and risk factors are missing. The patterns of data omissions dramatically 
vary across different risk factors, sponsors, and trustees, and over the time. Missing of one risk 
factor is in general positively correlated with missing of the other. Omissions of loan attributes are 
systematically associated with intermediate level of ex-post default risk. These findings suggest that if 
any data is sliced and diced based on the availability of loan attributes, the sample for default 
regression model may not be random. 
The second essay examines how default risk is associated with the affiliation between the loan 
provider and the sponsor. The identity of loan provider is, however, selectively disclosed for riskier 
mortgages. Without consideration of this selective disclosure, the affiliation is seemingly linked to 
higher ex-ante and ex-post default risk. In contrast, if the affiliation is correctly calculated by 
backfilling loan provider identity, or if the sample selection problem is explicitly addressed, then loan 
providers cherry-pick mortgages with better ex-ante risk characteristics for their affiliated 
securitizations. Also, with more complete sample where missing and erroneous loan provider 
identities are backfilled and corrected, the affiliation between the loan provider and the sponsor is 
shown to significantly decrease the likelihood of default.  
The third essay examines why sponsors are concerned about the performance of mortgages even 
after they are securitized and sold to investors in the form of bonds. Without any empirical tests, 




backed by the residual tranches. However, I show that sponsors with their own servicing platform 
increase their servicing quality even after the most junior tranche has dried up. This result implies 




CHAPTER 1. LOAN-LEVEL DISCLOSURE OF RISK FACTORS IN 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIZATIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
Loan-level analysis has become important more and more in the examination of mortgage industry.1 
Academics usually have access to the loan-level data in the web sites of trustees who serve as 
analytics providers for the investors in mortgage-backed securities (MBS).2 There are two tiers of 
loan-level data. The first is a group of loan underwriting characteristics sometimes called loan 
“attributes,” loan “characteristics,” or the “loan tape.” That data set consists of a variety of factors 
used for loan credit quality assessments such as mortgagor credit scores, the amount of home equity, 
the interest rate, and other items at the time of origination, reported for 1st and 2nd lien closed end 
loans and home equity lines of credits (HELOCs). Those attributes are originally produced by the 
originator.3 The originator transfers its loan-level information to the servicer who makes monthly 
collections of principals and interests, and manages defaults. The sponsor4 and underwriters5 of 
MBS use the characteristics of collateralized mortgages as the basis for representations made in the 
prospectus supplements and other offering documents. Through the trustee’s website, investors are 
informed of the attributes of mortgages back their mortgage securities. I explore the limitations and 
potential bias arising from reporting practice of these attributes in the paper. 
The second tier is the “remittance” data. Unlike cross-sectional loan attributes, the remittance data 
has a panel structure. The servicer tracks and generates time-varying information for a mortgage 
                                                          
1 The number of papers found with the keyword of “loan-level” in Google Scholar has monotonically 
increased from 134 in 2006 to 495 in 2013. 
2 The trustee owns the collateralized mortgages for the benefit of MBS investors. See American Bankers 
Association White Paper (2010) for the basic duties of the trustee. 
3 The originator is defined as a lending institution that extends mortgage credit to borrowers.  
4 Sponsors organize and initiate MBS transactions by purchasing and pooling mortgages to back the 
certificates issued by their mortgage trusts (SPVs). 
5 Underwriters of MBS are also called lead- and co-managers. 
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including monthly payments, outstanding balance, adjustment of interest rates, delinquency and 
payoff status. This remittance data is also posted and available from the trustee’s website.   
Many academic studies have used the trustee data in recent research. In their default or prepayment 
models, the response variable constructed with the remittance data is explained by a variety of loan 
characteristics. Mian and Sufi (2009) was one of the first to emphasize, generally, the importance of 
micro-level data to explore the origin of the subprime mortgage crisis. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and 
Vig (2010a), Demyanyk and Van Hermert (2011) and Mayer, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2013) use 
LoanPerformance from First American CoreLogic6. Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2012), Bubb and 
Kaufman (2009), and Keys, Seru, Mukherjee, and Vig (2010b), Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012), Piskorski, 
Seru, and Vig (2010), and Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) use Lender Processing Services7 (LPS or 
formerly known as McDash Analytics). Demiroglu and James (2012) 8 use ABSnet Loan from 
Lewtan9. Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013) and the present paper and use BBx from BlackBox 
Logic LLC.10 
Two basic assumptions imposed in all the studies cited above are that their loan-level data is correct, 
and that the samples they use appropriately represent the characteristics of population. As academic 
research has progressed, however, other authors have explored the possibility that a naïve use of 
loan-level data may be misleading. For instance, Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013) present the 
evidence that lien and occupancy types have been misreported for substantial portion of private-
label mortgages. Moreover, any omissions of data fields for certain loans may not be random, 
                                                          
6 See http://www.corelogic.com/solutions/loan-performance-secondary-market-analytics-for-capital-
markets.aspx#home-Datasets. 
7 See http://www.lpsvcs.com/Pages/default.aspx.   
8 Demiroglu and James (2012) note that risk may not be correctly measured in the deal-level analysis, but do 
not analyze the potential for such data shortcomings.  
9 See http://www.lewtan.com/products/absnet.html.   
10 See http://www.bbxlogic.com/bbx-logic-US-RMBS-non-agency-solutions.php.  
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leading to a sample selection bias. It is the second limitation in the loan-level data that I deal with in 
the paper. 
It is natural to be concerned about non-random samples in micro-level mortgage analyses, since 
every loan-level information is voluntarily disclosed with little or no regulatory, accounting, or legal 
guidance. While the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation AB (Reg 
AB) in 2005 in order to govern generally the disclosure regarding the securitization of assets 
including residential mortgages, Reg AB provides specific guidance only for deal level disclosures.  
The financial crisis in the late 2000’s was the opportunity to question the validity of the current 
reporting regime. In April 2010, the SEC released Proposed Rules (33-9117) to revise the existing 
Reg AB (colloquially referred to as “Reg AB II”). As summarized by Cadwalader11 at that time, “To 
ensure that investors receive sufficient information to evaluate an investment in ABS, the Proposed 
Rules require ABS issuers to disclose granular asset-level data (or with respect to credit card 
receivables, grouped account data) relating to the terms, obligor characteristics, and underwriting of 
each asset backing an ABS (or group of assets, as applicable.12  In proposing rules for standardized asset-
level disclosure in ABS transactions, the SEC is embracing an approach that it declined to take in the original 
adoption of Reg AB, where it concluded that it would not be ‘practical or effective to draft detailed disclosure guides for 
each asset type that may be securitized.’ 13 
                                                          
11 “SEC Proposes Significant Enhancements to Regulation of Asset-Backed Securities,”  Apr 20, 2010, at 
http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/sec-proposes-significant-enhancements-to-
regulation-of-asset-backed-securities 
12 See Proposed Rule 17 C.F.R. § 229.1111(h) at 383.  The SEC is proposing to exempt ABS backed by 
stranded costs from the obligation to provided asset-level data. Stranded costs are certain capital costs 
incurred by public utilities which are permitted, by action of a state legislature or other regulatory authority, to 
be recouped over time from rate payers. 
13 See page 1509 of the adopting release for Regulation AB (Release Nos. 33-8518 and 34-50905). 
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Under the Proposed Rules for Reg AB II, 28 items must be disclosed at the loan level regardless of 
asset types, and 137 additional items are required to be disclosed for residential mortgage loans. 
Nonetheless, the proposed regulation is currently in its third comment period, due in part to 
concerns about how much individual loan data can be disclosed without violating consumer privacy 
laws. Thus, loan-level attribute data remains voluntarily disclosed.  
Absence of formal reporting requirement for loan-level information implies that the source data 
used commonly in academic studies and cited in policy development may be affected by systematic 
biases from missing loan-level data. This paper is designed to make three unique contributions to the 
literature of loan-level analysis. First, I provide an extensive illustration of the disclosure practices of 
loan-level information across different major risk factors, different time, and different institutions 
engaged in the securitization process. I show data fields are often missing for a substantial amount 
of loans14 although loan-level information has been available generally more and more over time. 
Also, the disclosure rates for major risk factors are shown to dramatically vary across different 
sponsors and trustees.15  These findings suggest the missing of loan-level data fields is not trivial at 
all, and we may need to carefully control for the variation of omissions along a variety of 
dimensions. 
Second, I examine how the missing of one risk factor affects the omission of the other. I show loan 
attributes generally tend to be reported together and missing together, suggesting that attrition of 
loan-level information may be more severe for a particular group of mortgages that were poorly 
handled in the securitization process.  
                                                          
14 For example, the information for negative amortization is missing for approximately 90% of the mortgages 
in BBx. 
15 According to BBx, Washington Mutual provided borrowers’ credit scores only for 40.9% of mortgages for 
which it served as the trustee while Wells Fargo provided for 96.1%. 
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Third, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that explores the relation between loan-
level disclosures (or lack thereof) and the performance of securitized mortgages. I find evidence that 
omissions of loan attributes are systematically linked to intermediate level of ex post default risk. For 
example, mortgages whose FICO credit scores are missing default more than those with FICO 
scores higher than 680 by 5.75% to 8.02% depending on model specifications. The increase in 
defaults associated with omissions of FICO is economically and statistically significant, however it is 
smaller than the effects of FICO less than 680 (11.08% to 20.44%). This suggests the possibility that 
credit scores are less likely to be reported for the mortgages with intermediate level of FICO scores 
(approximately with the mean of 680). This may imply the convexity of the curve on the coordinates 
whose X- and Y-axes represent FICO scores and the corresponding disclosure rate respectively. 
This is an arguably reasonable disclosure pattern for two reasons: 1) sponsors may be more willing 
to convey the FICO score if it is high; 2) mortgages for borrowers with low FICO scores may have 
riskier other loan attributes than those with higher FICO scores, and MBS investors would demand 
the disclosure of FICO more aggressively if other loan attributes indicate higher risk. Failure to 
account for this relation between missing data and default risk can, therefore, lead to biased 
inferences in loan-level analyses and poor policy recommendations. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the loan characteristic data reported 
by vendors and how that has been implemented in key academic studies. Section 3 shows which data 
is commonly missing and how missing data may be related to certain securitization sponsors and 
trustees. Section 4 illustrates patterns among missing data fields, particularly how missing data fields 
for one characteristic are commonly related to missing data fields for others. Section 5 explores 
empirically the relationship between disclosure and ex post default risk. The last section concludes. 
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1.2 Loan characteristics disclosed in securitization data 
Prior research relies crucially on several key data fields included in the trustee data. Table 1.1 
presents the loan characteristics relied upon in 11 key papers in the literature.16 The LPS data was 
used in six of the papers including Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2012), Bubb and Kaufman (2009), 
Keys, Seru, Mukherjee, and Vig (2010b), Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012), Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010), 
and Ghent and Kudlyak (2011). Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010a), Demyanyk and Van 
Hermert (2011) and Mayer, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2013) use LoanPerformance. Demiroglu and 
James (2012) and Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013) use ABSnet Loan and BBx respectively.  
The LPS data is completely different from ABSNet, BBx, and LoanPerformance in that it has 
mortgages that are both securitized and retained on banks’ balance sheets while the other three 
datasets contain only securitized mortgages. ABSNet, BBx, and LoanPerformance all retrieve the 
data from the same trustees: the base data is, therefore, all the same. 
Mason, Imerman, and Lee (2014) identify 22 loan attributes used for loan-level estimations in the 11 
key papers. The studies used 11 data fields, on average, ranging from Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and 
Vig (2013) with four fields to Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) with fifteen fields. Every paper 
uses Loan Type to screen first mortgages from second liens of various types. FICO credit score is 
the most frequently used data field in the loan-level analysis, followed by Loan Amount, Doc Type, 
Loan Purpose, and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Indicators associated with Adjustable-Rate Mortgage 
(ARM) Margin, Investment Bank Underwriter, and Negative Amortization, and Loan Originator are 
the least used. 
                                                          
16 The 11 key papers meet three requirements: 1) It should be published in one of the qualified finance 
journals (Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, and Journal of 
Financial and Qualitative Analysis); 2) It should rely on loan-level analysis; and 3) It should use one of the 
loan-level data including ABSNet, BBx, LoanPerformance, and LPS.   
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I use the trustee data covered by BlackBox Logic (BBx) to examine how the loan-level disclosure 
practices vary across different major loan attributes during the pre-crisis period. As of March 2014, 
BBx contains data on 21,898,192 closed-end loans and HELOCs with original balances of more 
than $4.8 trillion.  
BBx reports loan characteristics in the name of “Loans_Chars.” This consists of 189 variables that 
fall into 36 categories. Blackbox collects information for 127 fields from trustees, which are 
standardized into 61 variables.11 This paper does not cover variables: 1) if they are associated with 
post-securitization characteristics rather than with loan underwriting; 2) if the coverage for a 
cleansed variable is substantially larger than a raw variable (hence the cleansed variable does not 
properly represent the reporting practices by lenders or securitizers); or 3) if they are rarely 
employed in loan-level analysis.  
As a result of this selection rule, I focus on 16 variables that are “Cleansed and Standardized Across 
Data Providers.” They are categorical variables related to loan types and numerical attributes at the 
time of origination such as Negative amortization (NEGAMSTATUSIND), Loan Originator 
Identity (ORIGINATORNAME), Balloon  (BALLOONSTATUSIND), Combined-lien LTV ratio 
(COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC), Documentation (DOCTYPESUMMARY), Interest Only 
(IOSTATUSIND), Lien (LIENTYPE), FICO credit score (FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC), 
Property appraisal value (ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC), Purpose (PURPOSETYPE), 
Occupancy (OCCTYPE), Interest rate (ORIGINTRTCALC), Property (PROPTYPE), Simple LTV 
(ORIGLTVRATIOCALC), interest rate adjustability (INTRTTYPESUMMARY), and Loan amount 
(ORIGINALBALCALC).17 
                                                          
17 BBx data field names are in parentheses. 
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Of those 16, 13 overlap directly with typical variables used in key studies, 1 (appraisal value) overlaps 
indirectly with those key variables (since it is the basis for LTV), and two are subsumed into the 
summary measure “Mortgage Type” (BALLOONSTATUSIND and IOSTATUSIND) in the list of 
fields used in academic studies.  
The data fields are a combination of numeric data about the loans and qualitative data about the 
loans. In terms of numeric data: 
 COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC considers every loan on the property, and is thought to be a 
more relevant risk factor than ORIGLTVRATIOCALC for second lien mortgages whose 
lender has claims subordinate to senior lenders.18  
 FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC is a borrower’s credit score issued by credit bureaus 
such as TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax based on the software licensed from the Fair 
Isaac Corporation. FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC is deemed to be one of the 
summary measures for default risk because it captures the probability of negative events in 
two years.19  
 ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC is the property value estimated and provided by trustees. 
While this field is not used directly in the studies, it is the basis for computing the LTV 
fields. 
 ORIGINTRTCALC is the coupon rate charged to the mortgagor for the first month after 
origination. All these numeric variables are measured at the time of loan closing. 
                                                          
18 According to the prospectus supplement for ACE 2006-ASP2. “… Mortgage Loans secured by second 
liens that have high combined loan-to-value ratios because it is comparatively more likely that the Servicer 
would determine foreclosure to be uneconomical in the case of such Group II Mortgage Loans. The rate of 
default of second lien Group II Mortgage Loans may be greater than that of mortgage loans secured by first 
liens on comparable properties.” 
19 Piskortski, Seru, and Vig (2010) documented FICO score, loan-to-value ratio, and interest rate type are 
three basic components for the loan contracts.  
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 ORIGLTVRATIOCALC is defined as a simple ratio of a single primary loan amount and 
the property value.  
 ORIGINALBALCALC means the dollar amount of principal. This variable is the numerator 
of ORIGLTVRATIOCALC and COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC.  
 
In terms of qualitative data: 
 Negative amortization mortgage (, or payment option ARM) indicated with 
NEGAMSTATUSIND in BBx allows borrowers to defer monthly payments increasing their 
principals.  
 ORIGINATORNAME for each loan is “the name of the entity that originated the 
mortgage.”  
 BALLOONSTATUSIND indicates loans for which a large lump-sum payment is scheduled 
near the maturity at the expense of low coupon payments during the first several years.20  
 DOCTYPESUMMARY means documentation type. This is a standardized code whose 
values indicate full, reduced21, low, no, or unknown amount of income22 documentation 
provided by mortgagors.  
                                                          
20 According to the prospectus supplement for FFML 2006-FF17, “Balloon loans pose a special payment risk 
because the borrower must make a large lump sum payment of principal at the end of the loan term.” 
21 The prospectus for RALI 2006-QH1 documents that “Certain of the mortgage loans have been originated 
under “reduced documentation” or “no stated income” programs, which require less documentation and 
verification than do traditional “full documentation” programs. Generally, under a “reduced documentation” 
program, no verification of a mortgagor’s stated income is undertaken by the originator. Under a “no stated 
income” program, certain borrowers with acceptable payment histories will not be required to provide any 
information regarding income and no other investigation regarding the borrower’s income will be undertaken. 
Under a “no income/no asset” program, no verification of a mortgagor’s income or assets is undertaken by 
the originator. The underwriting for those mortgage loans may be based primarily or entirely on an appraisal 
of the mortgaged property and the LTV ratio at origination.” 
22 Mortgagors are usually required to provide their “assets, liabilities, income, credit history, employment 
history and personal information.” (See the section of “underwriting guideline” in the prospectus supplement 
10 
 
 Borrowers may also be allowed not to pay principals for a certain period of time if they get 
interest-only (or IO) mortgages indicated with IOSTATUSIND in BBx. 
 LIENTYPE is an indicator for lenders’ relevant claim positions on the collateralized 
properties.  
 PURPOSETYPE is associated with the reason for loans among purchase, refinancing, and 
cash-out refinancing.   
 OCCTYPE shows whether the mortgagor uses the property for primary residence, 
investment, or second home. Investor loans are said to be riskier than owner-occupied or 
second home loans.23  
 PROPTYPE indicates which the property belongs to among single family, planned urban 
development, condominium, etc.  
 INTRTTYPESUMMARY indicates whether the monthly coupon amount varies across time. 
If the interest rate is periodically variable depending on the value of an index, those 
mortgages are called an adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) while the others are called fixed 
rate mortgages (FRMs).  
 
Financial researchers seem to at least partially recognize the potential for data errors and screen the 
data for obvious problems. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010), for instance, use an algorithm to remove 
outliers and errors by excluding loans with non-traditional maturities and extreme values of FICO 
and LTV.  But researchers still tend to ignore the magnitude and importance of missing data. 
Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013), for instance, drop loans with missing values of CLTV or those 
                                                          
for RALI 2006-QH1.) However, the most recent cycle of BBx restricts the content of “documentation” only 
to income in its data definition file. 
23 See https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/selling/b3/2/02.html#Occupancy.20Type 
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with large difference between LTV and CLTV. But academic studies do not check to see how much 
data they are losing and how missing observations affect their sample and their research results. In 
fact, studies stand to lose substantial information and/or induce significant observation bias if they 
just winsorize or exclude loans with unknown or invalid entries of attributes.  
Table 1.1. Summary of unknown loan characteristic values reported by BBx 





















Supplementary reports accompanying vendor data sets often show the importance of the problem. 
Each month, BBx sends to customers a “documentation package” summarizing all available data 
fields, additions, and changes to its reporting. The BBx documentation packages contain two key 
files relating to our research. One, Loans_Chars_Frequency_201403.pdf, reports directly the number 
of entries for selected data fields with a value of “U”, or unknown. The other, 
Loans_Chars_QA_201403.pdf, reports the same measures for every non-numeric (categorical) loan 
characteristic data field. Both show directly that there exist “unknown” entries for a substantial 
number of loans. Table 1.1 illustrates the results shown in those table for our 16 data fields.24 
The number of loans whose characteristics are not reported varies dramatically across different data 
fields. INTRTTYPESUMMARY and PROPTYPE are reported for most of the population, with 
only 3.9% and 8.6% of observations unknown, respectively. In contrast, NEGAMSTATUSIND is 
unknown 94.8% of the time, or for about 21 million out of 22 million loans. 
ORIGINATORNAME is missing 84.6% of the time.  
BALLOONSTATUSIND and IOSTATUSIND are unknown in 61.5% and 43.9% of the cases 
reported. COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC is unknown in 47.3% of the cases reported. DOCTYPE – 
which 8 of the 11 cited studies rely upon – is unknown in 41.1% of the cases reported. LIENTYPE 
is unknown for 26.5% of the cases. FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC – used in every study 
cited above – is unknown in 29.3% of the cases reported. ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC is 
                                                          
24 Table 1.2 presents the percentages of loans whose attributes are reported as “U” in 
Loans_Chars_Frequency_201403.pdf and the reported (one minus) percentage of valid observations in 
Loans_Chars_QA_201403.pdf. Neither file provides the distributions for numerical variables 
(COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC, FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC, ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC, 
ORIGINTRTCALC, ORIGLTVRATIOCALC, and ORIGINALBALCALC) and ORIGINATORNAME. 
Hence, I calculate the missing rates for those variables from Dec 2013 BBx. The “percent undisclosed” and 




unknown in 18.5% of the cases reported. OCCTYPE (used in 3 of the 11 studies) and 
PURPOSETYPE (used in 7 of the 11 studies) are unknown for 10.2% and 13.6% of the cases, 
respectively. 
The statistics reported by BBx, however, cover the entire history of the data set and use all loans, 
including HELOCs. Still, the disclosures cited by BBx should alert researchers to the potential for 
selection bias. Since most research of interest focuses on some period associated with the recent 
financial crisis and focuses only on closed-end loans, it is more illustrative to look only at first- and 
second-lien loans securitized in 2005-2007. The next sections examine our 16 characteristics limited 
to those loans to get a better idea of how the lack of reporting could affect recent work. 
1.3 Major observations for loan-level disclosure 
1.3.1 Disclosure rates for major risk factors 
I start the description of loan-level reporting practices with the disclosure rates of 16 key attributes 
for the 11,956,563 first mortgages reported in BBx associated with securitizations issued during 
2005, 2006, and 2007. The key attributes are chosen on the basis of their prevalence of missing 
values in the BBx data. As noted above, there is a significant overlap with the data fields typically 
used in academic research.  
Figure 1.1 presents the proportion of mortgages that reported major risk factors. Among the 16 loan 
characteristics, the disclosure rates are lower than 90% for 10 factors including 
NEGAMSTATUSIND (9.8%), ORIGINATORNAME (24.8%), BALLOONSTATUSIND 
(40.0%), COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC (66.6%), DOCTYPESUMMARY (68.9%), 
IOSTATUSIND (70.5%), LIENTYPE (80.9%), FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC (85.0%), 
ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC (85.0%), and PURPOSETYPE (89.3%). The least reported 
factor is NEGAMSTATUSIND, or the indicator for negative amortization, which is followed by 
ORIGINATORNAME, or the institution that sold the mortgage into the pool. The low disclosure 
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rates for key data fields used in academic studies in Table 1.1 suggest that academic researchers may 
lack significant information upon which to base conclusions.  
 
Figure 1.1. The disclosure rate by major risk factors in 2005-2007 (first liens only) 
 
Figures 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 show how the loan-level disclosure rates in BBx have changed over time for 
major numeric and categorical loan characteristics. I restricted the sample period until 2008 because 
the private-label mortgage market was practically frozen after that. While disclosure rates increase 
over time for most of the loan characteristics, there is a substantial decrease in the disclosure of 
FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC (96.1% to 78.2%), ORIGINTRTCALC (93.5% to 73.0%) 
and ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC (83.2% to 65.5%) between 2007 and 2008. Among the 
categorical loan attributes, BALOONSTATUSIND has also decreased except for 2005 and 2006.25 
On the other hand, it is notable that the disclosure of originator identities dramatically increased 
from 2005 when Reg AB was adopted and the originators who provide 10% or more of the pool 
                                                          
25 According to The Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, option ARMs had increased from $145 billion in 















assets were required to be summarized in aggregate in the offering documents, even though those 
were not required to be disclosed at the loan level. 26 
Figure 1.2.1. The yearly time-variation in the disclosure rate for numeric risk factors 
 
Figure 1.2.2. The yearly time-variation in the disclosure rate for categorical risk factors 
                                                          
26 While an originator may be reported at the loan level, there is no regulatory guidance or rule on the 
definition of the originator that is reported in this field. Thus, it appears that institutions reported to be the 












































1.3.2 The relationship between loan-level disclosure and deal-level disclosure 
Curiously, the comparison of the deal prospectuses and the loan-level BBx data reveals that some 
loan-level information summarized in prospectus supplements was not made available to investors 
before the crisis. For example, FICO score distributions are almost always presented in 
prospectuses. However, data fields for FICO scores can be missing in the loan-level data made 
available by trustees. Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics on FICO presented in the prospectus 
supplements for AMSI 2006-R1, sponsored by Ameriquest. The table shows FICO calculated for all 
9,046 loans in the deal.  However, the loan-level data from trustee Deutsche Bank reports FICO 
score for zero loans.  
Table 1.2. A summary table in the prospectus for AMSI 2006-R1 
 
 
Table 1.3 breaks down the disclosure rate for each loan attribute by sponsors for securitizations 
issued in 2006. Since sponsor is not a legal designation, and it is not an item provided in BBx, it 
must be hand-assembled, limiting our present analysis to loans securitized in 2006. The reporting of 





Table 1.3. Disclosure rate for major loan characteristics by 10 largest sponsors in 2006 
 
Notes: Largest 10 sponsors in BBx are Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, EMC Mortgage Corp, Residential Funding Corp, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Deutsch Bank, DLJ Mortgage Capital, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase.
Largest 10 sponsors CW LB EMC RFC GS MS DB DLJ BOA JPM
Aggregate 
Disclosure 
Rate by # 
of Loans
# of loans 659,703 389,962 318,784 314,100 243,423 198,536 192,101 181,725 170,279 159,244 N/A
NEGAMSTATUSIND 8.80% 11.00% 18.10% 9.60% 4.60% 0.00% 0.80% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 7.14%
ORIGINATORNAME 0.50% 54.20% 61.40% 0.00% 46.80% 45.50% 55.60% 7.70% 42.40% 42.10% 30.93%
BALLOONSTATUSIND 22.00% 62.60% 59.70% 100.00% 32.40% 36.40% 22.80% 76.00% 8.80% 65.60% 47.60%
COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC 99.50% 72.90% 56.70% 48.10% 91.50% 58.10% 44.80% 93.40% 76.30% 67.30% 74.38%
DOCTYPESUMMARY 98.30% 70.40% 54.30% 79.70% 77.50% 39.40% 82.60% 98.00% 90.80% 89.70% 79.48%
IOSTATUSIND 92.00% 64.80% 97.40% 99.20% 88.80% 43.90% 91.40% 34.70% 92.30% 50.90% 79.99%
ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC 98.40% 59.50% 91.20% 100.00% 93.40% 94.40% 80.60% 38.70% 88.00% 63.40% 84.05%
PURPOSETYPE 98.40% 97.10% 57.00% 80.30% 92.00% 92.90% 90.70% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 90.37%
LIENTYPE 99.70% 97.20% 93.50% 100.00% 85.50% 48.70% 96.90% 100.00% 98.10% 43.40% 90.45%
OCCTYPE 99.50% 97.10% 59.50% 93.70% 99.60% 92.90% 93.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 93.21%
FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC 99.30% 86.10% 99.20% 100.00% 95.60% 84.10% 99.60% 97.40% 98.90% 83.90% 95.17%
PROPTYPE 99.50% 99.80% 99.50% 80.70% 99.80% 99.70% 99.70% 99.80% 99.90% 99.90% 97.57%
ORIGLTVRATIOCALC 99.50% 97.80% 97.20% 100.00% 99.20% 98.80% 94.20% 93.10% 99.40% 99.30% 98.20%
INTRTTYPESUMMARY 98.90% 99.90% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.73%
ORIGINTRTCALC 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.60% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.90% 100.00% 100.00% 99.95%
ORIGINALBALCALC 100.00% 99.80% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.90% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.97%
Total Disclosure Rate for 16 Fields 82.14% 79.39% 77.79% 80.68% 81.67% 70.93% 78.29% 77.42% 80.94% 75.34%
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Table 1.3 shows that NEGAMSTATUSIND is reported the least, for 7.14% of loans, with EMC 
Mortgage Corp. (EMC) reporting the field the most among sponsors (18.1% of the time) and 
Morgan Stanley (MS), DLJ Mortgage Capital (DLJ), and JP Morgan Chase (JPM) reporting 0.00% of 
the time. Bank of America (BOA) reports NEGAMSTATUSIND 0.20% of the time and Deutsch 
Bank (DB) reports the field 0.80% of the time, and Goldman Sachs (GS) 4.60% of the time. 
Residential Funding Corp (RFC), Countrywide (CW), and Lehman Brothers (LB) all report around 
10% of the time. 
ORIGINATORNAME is reported 30.93% of the time, although RFC reports the field 0.00% of the 
time, CW only 0.50% of the time, and DLJ only 7.70% of the time. The others report 
ORIGINATORNAME about half the time, by number of loans.  
Along with NEGAMSTATUSIND  and ORIGINATORNAME, 
ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC, IOSTATUSIND, DOCTYPESUMMARY, 
COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC, and BALLOONSTATUSIND were all disclosed by the top ten 
sponsors in BBx less than 90% of the time by loan count in the aggregate. 
BALLOONSTATUSIND was reported on average for 47.60% of loans, with a low of 8.80% 
(BOA) and a high of 100.00% (RFC). COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC was reported on average for 
44.805% of loans, with a low of 99.50% (DB) and a high of 100.00% (CW). DOCTYPESUMMARY 
was reported on average for 79.48% of loans, with a low of 39.40% (MS) and a high of 98.30% 
(CW). IOSTATUSIND was reported on average for 79.48% of loans, with a low of 34.70% (DLJ) 
and a high of 99.20% (RFC). ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC was reported on average for 
84.05% of loans, with a low of 38.70% (DLJ) and a high of 100.00% (RFC). 
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ORIGINALBALCALC, ORIGINRTCALC, INTRTTYPESUMMARY, and 
ORIGLTVRATIOCALC were all disclosed by the top ten sponsors for more than 98.00% of loans 
in 2006. 
Among our 16 characteristics, MS loans have the most missing data, with 70.93% of coverage for 
our 16 attributes, followed by JPM (75.34%), DLJ (77.42%), EMC (77.79%) and DB (78.29%). The 
highest coverage is from CW with 82.14%. With such uneven coverage among deal sponsors, it 
seems necessary to control for the variations in data omissions across different sponsors.  
In Table 1.4, I calculate the disclosure rate for our 16 key loan characteristics by the top 10 trustees 
for 2005 to 2007 securitizations. As described above, the individual loan characteristics are initially 
produced by the originator. The originator conveys those to the servicer so that the servicer knows 
what types of loans they are servicing. If the loans are securitized (as are all the loans used here), the 
loan characteristics would be conveyed to the sponsor and investment bank as the basis for 
representation made in the prospectus supplements and other offering documents. Those attributes 
may also be posted on the trustee’s web site in order to inform investors about the loans. The 
hypothesis, therefore, is that the trustee may somehow be associated with reporting.  
Here, I find that there is even greater heterogeneity in reporting of certain loan common attributes at 
the loan level among trustees, so that reporting is highly correlated with the deal trustee. Again, 
coverage of NEGAMSTATUSIND and ORIGINATORNAME is lowest, with 8.13% and 25.02% 
coverage, in the aggregate. DB, RFC, LaSalle, JPM and Citi all report de minimis coverage of 
NEGAMSTATUSIND, ranging from 0.00% to 2.20%, while WaMu covers 51.90%. BONY, RFC, 
IndyMac, and WaMu all provide de minimis coverage of ORIGINATORNAME, ranging from 0.20% 









Some trustees report OCCTYPE, PURPOSETYPE, ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC, 
LIENTYPE, IOSTATUSIND, DOCTYPESUMMARY, COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC, and 
BALLOONSTATUSIND at levels of 95.00% and above, but others report those same fields at rates 
down to 0.20%,with no one trustee exceeding 21.70%. Reporting for PURPOSETYPE ranges from 
0.20% (LaSalle) to 100.00% (JPM, WaMu), a 99.80% spread;  DOCTYPESUMMARY ranges from 
1.30% (LaSalle) to 97.60% (WaMu), a 96.30% spread; OCCTYPE ranges from 7.00% (Lasalle) to 
100.00% (RFC, WaMu), a 93.00% spread; BALLOONSTATUSIND ranges from 11.30% (BONY) 
to 100% (USBank, JPM), an 88.70% spread; COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC ranges from 7.60% 
(LaSalle) to 95.90% (IndyMac), an 88.30% spread; IOSTATUSIND ranges from 11.70% (DB) to 
100.00% (Lasalle), an 88.30% spread; LIENTYPE ranges from 18.60% (DB) to 99.30% (LaSalle), an 
80.70% spread; ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC ranges from 21.70% (Citi) to 100.00% (RFC, 
WaMu), a 78.30% spread; finally, FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC ranges from 40.90% 
(WaMu) to 99.90% (RFC), a 59.00% spread for a variable that is almost universally relied upon in 
academic studies.  
ORIGINRTCALC, ORIGINALBALCALC, INTRTTYPESUMMARY, ORIGLTVRATIOCALC, 
and PROPTYPE are reported more than roughly 85% of the time by all trustees, although only 
Interest rate, Loan amount, and Interest rate type are reported more than 98.00% of the time.  
Among our 16 characteristics, loans in which deals for which DB is trustee have the worst coverage 
(61.39%), followed by Lasalle (64.84%), Citi (66.79%), JPM (72.17%) and Bony (76.61%). The top 
trustee is WaMu (82.69%), although WaMu is also the smallest trustee of the top ten in terms of the 
number of loans. With even more uneven coverage among deal trustees than deal sponsors, it seems 




1.3.3 The possibility of inferring loan-level disclosure from other sources 
In this section I explore whether (1) those missing loan-level observations are trivial, i.e., whether a 
missing value is zero because the data is reported elsewhere, like the prospectus supplement, (2) 
whether they are truly missing and irreconcilable, and (3) whether there are apparent discrepancies 
among reporting sources. I establish that while in some cases one can backfill data using inferential 
methods, there is no single rule that can be implemented to do so without careful attention to deal-
level and loan-level reporting. 
First, I examine the possibility of using prospectus supplement disclosures using the Balloon Type 
data field, whose loan-level disclosure rate is the third lowest (39.97%) following 
NEGAMSTATUSIND (9.84%) and ORIGINATORNAME (24.84%). Then, I explore the more 
difficult case of the Loan Originator field.  
1.3.3.1 Inferring Balloon Type from deal-level data 
As a first consideration, prospectus supplement disclosures need not exactly represent the 
composition of the loan pool that is finally securitized. Rather, it is common for prospectus 
supplement to contain language to the effect of, “Prior to the Closing Date… we may remove 
mortgage loans from the mortgage pool and we may substitute other mortgage loans for the 
mortgage loans we remove. The depositor believes that the information set forth in this prospectus 
supplement with respect to the mortgage pool as presently constituted is representative of the 
characteristics of the mortgage pool as it will be constituted on the Closing Date, although certain 
characteristics of the mortgage loans in the mortgage pool may vary.”27  
                                                          
27 See, for instance, BSARM 2006-4 Prospectus Supplement at 26. 
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Still, in some cases one can use prospectus supplement disclosures to fill in missing data. For 
example, a prospectus supplement may document that the pools consist of 100% or 0% balloon 
mortgages although the value for BALLOONSTATUSIND is “U” for every loan in those deals.  
For instance, the prospectus supplement for MSAC 2006-NC1 documents, “Approximately 0.00% 
of the mortgage loans will not be fully amortizing over their terms to maturity and, thus, will require 
substantial principal payments, i.e., balloon payments, at their stated maturity.” Alternatively, 
according to the representations and warranties section in the prospectuses for HVMLT 2006-3, 5, 
and 9, “(z) No mortgage loan has a balloon payment feature.” For both of those deals, 
BALLOONSTAUSIND is unknown for 100% of the cases. In both cases, one could use the 
prospectus supplement disclosures to fill in the proper data (or a reasonably accurate approximation 
of such data).  
In other cases, information for balloon type is unavailable at the loan-level but partially available at 
the deal-level. In this case, however, prospectuses provide no information about balloon type other 
than a simple hint that balloon mortgages may be included in the pool. For instance, the value for 
balloon type variable is “unknown” in BBx for every mortgage in BAFC 2006-1 while the 
prospectus for BAFC 2006-1 states merely that “A trust may include one or more of the following 
types of mortgage loans… [,including] balloon loans.”28  
Similarly, CMLTI 2006-WFH4 provides only partial reporting. In CMLTI 2006-WFH4, only 0.58% 
of the loans are reported to have balloon payments in the BBx data while the prospectus supplement 
documents 304 such loans out of a total of 5,782, for a proportion of 5.26%. (6.07% by principal 
                                                          
28 Prospectus, Banc of America Funding Corporation, Depositor, Bank of America, National Association, 
Sponsor, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, January 27, 2006, p. 2 
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balance).29 The difference implies that approximately 270 of the balloon loans in this deal are 
reported in loan-level data as “unknown.”  
In yet other cases, there may exist an apparent discrepancy for balloon type reporting between loan-
level data and the deal-level prospectus supplements. For instance, in BSABS 2006-IM1, 4,320 out 
of 4,321 loans (99.98%) have balloon feature according to the loan-level BBx data. However, the 
BSABS 2006-IM1 prospectus supplement lists only 666 out of 4,321 loans possessing balloon 
characteristics, or 15.41% of the pool (4.42% by principal balance).30 
While I cannot remedy the discrepancy cited above without substantial additional investigation, I can 
see that in some cases “unknown” balloon types can be ruled out if deal prospectus supplements do 
not allow such loans. In those cases, at least some of the missing values can be back-filled, therefore 
potential bias can be alleviated through further investigation.  
1.3.4. Disclosure of loan providers 
Reg AB requires securitizers to report the distribution of material originators (defined as those that 
originate more than 10% of the mortgages in the pool) at the deal level.31 In contrast, there exists no 
guidance for reporting the originator at the loan-level. In fact, there appears to be significant 
discrepancy in such reporting.  
Sponsors often acquire mortgages from initial loan originators or entities that purchase loans from 
those originators. Given the absence of any regulation for loan-level disclosure of loan originators, 
sponsors seem to have chosen among institutions along the chain of origination to be disclosed at 
the loan level. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the number of loan originators disclosed at the 
loan-level in 2005 to 2007. The vast majority of deals in this period, 2,235 deals in total, reported 
                                                          
29 See CMLTI 2006-WFH4 prospectus supplement at 33. 
30 See BSABS 2006-IM1 prospectus supplement at p. 162. 
31 See the section for originators on p. 1538 of 33-8518FR. 
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zero originators at the loan-level. Around 175 deals reported a single originator name for all loans in 
the deal, and almost 250 reported two originator names. On the other end of the scale, around 125 
deals reported fifty or more originator names associated with the deal.  
Additionally, as shown in Figures 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, there has been substantial variation across time in 
the reporting of different loan characteristics. Except for COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC, 
NEGAMSTATUSIND, BALLOONSTATSIND, and, ORIGINATORNAME all other attributes 
have historically been consistently disclosed for 30% or more of loans in securitized pools. Over 
time, however, the loan-level disclosure rate for ORIGINATORNAME has increased dramatically, 
from 5.5% in 2005 to 64.6% in 2008.  
Figure 1.3. Histogram of the number of loan originators disclosed in loan-level data32 
                                                          
32 The deals with more than 100 of originators are treated to have 100 of originators. (Some deals 




Still, that increase in ORIGINATORNAME reporting masks substantial changes in the nature of 
reporting both within and across deals. For example, Taylor, Bean, and Whitaker (TBW) always 
purchases mortgages from brokers and correspondents as a wholesale lender and a sponsor of its 
own securitizations. In BBx, it reported 1,114 brokers as the originators for 3,001 mortgages in 
TBW 2006-5. However, TBW reported itself as the sole originator for 2,565 mortgages in TBW 
2006-6. Moreover, while the originator identity in the loan-level data varies across different series of 
TBW securitizations, TBW is always reported to be the single originator in their prospectus 
supplements.  
Obviously no inferential approach could be used to add originator detail to TBW’s disclosure of 
itself as originator when it is obvious that many others are involved. On the other hand, detail on 
every single person that originated loans in each deal would not meaningfully help researchers 
evaluate risk. Somewhere in between is an economically meaningful balance of whose guidelines the 
origination was supposed to have adhered to, whether because they were the originator or because 
they provided funding to the originator contingent upon such guidelines being followed. But 
because of the multiplicity of potential originators to be reported with each loan in the present data, 
further work is needed to meaningfully disentangle the reporting relationships in this data field.33  
1.4 Patterns of disclosure among multiple data fields 
In this section, I examine the empirical relation between loan-level disclosures across different 
characteristics to see if there are patterns of non-disclosure among the different data fields.  A 
simple correlation matrix looking at the pairwise correlations between disclosure dummy variables 
                                                          
33 See, for instance, Mason and Lee 2014.  
27 
 
that are 1 if the data item is reported and 0 otherwise provides intriguing evidence that loans without 
information on one data field are likely to lack data on others.   
Pearson’s Phi coefficients are used to measure the association between two dichotomous disclosure 
indicators in Table 1.5. Every correlation coefficient is significant at the 1% level except for the 
correlation between NEGAMSTATUSIND and OCCTYPE. The sample is restricted to the loans 
securitized in 2005 to 2007. Second lien loans are excluded, as are loans that disclose lien as 
unknown. 
First, note that most of the correlation coefficients are positive indicating that many of the data 
items are reported together and missing together. Among 105 non-diagonal elements in the upper 
triangular matrix presented in Table 1.5, only 26 elements have negative values. Therefore, it is not 
likely that one risk factor is missing at the expense of disclosing the other. However, disclosure of a 
few variables do have frequently negative correlations with others. Negative correlations are the 
most frequent for disclosure of BALLOONSATUSIND (9), which is followed by 
ORIGINTRTCALC (7). In contrast, disclosures of ORIGLTVRATIOCALC and 
ORIGINALBALCALC have no negative associations with disclosures of other loan attributes. 
The highest correlation coefficient is 0.78 which occurs between OCCTYPE and PURPOSETYPE. 
Thus, disclosing whether a mortgage is for an owner-occupied home is likely to occur with reporting 
whether the mortgage is for a purchase, refinance, or cash-out refinance. Next, information 
regarding whether or not a loan was interest only, or IOSTATUSIND, is highly correlated with the 
documentation provided with correlation coefficients greater than 0.40. This is very interesting 
considering that at the center of the crisis was the higher rate of low-doc/no-doc loans that were 
made as well as the increased number of exotic mortgages. The fact that, empirically, these two 
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critical risk factors were likely to be reported together or missing together suggests any analysis made 
regarding their relative contribution to the performance of the loan would be severely biased.   
OCCTYPE and PURPOSETYPE have high correlation with COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC (0.34 
and 0.32), which is a bit puzzling.  The interpretation here is that a loan not having disclosed the 
type of occupancy or purpose was more likely to also omit the COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC. One 
would think that these two variables would be independent of home equity, but the substantial 
correlation coefficients indicate that there may be something else going on.  
In fact, COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC disclosure has a correlation coefficient higher than 0.1 with 
six out of the remaining 15 variables; four out of those six are qualitative variables. Considering the 
importance of COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC in risk analysis, it is worth looking into why it would 
be so highly correlated with these other factors.   
Lastly, let us turn our attention to correlations between FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC and 
the other variables. Four out of the 15 other variables have a correlation coefficient greater than 
0.10.  This suggests that when one of those data items is missing – which include 
DOCTYPESUMMARY, IOSTATUSIND, ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC, and 
ORIGINATORNAME – it is likely to also be missing the FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC.  
This too would have an impact on the results of any risk analysis being performed on the mortgages 
collateralizing the RMBS of interest. 
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Table 1.5. Correlations among disclosures for verifiable first-lien loans securitized 2005-2007 
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I can also test the institutions’ unwillingness to disclose risky values with the credit category assigned 
by issuers. While FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC is missing for just under 15% of mortgages, 
those missing values are, again, not random.  
Table 1.6. FICO disclosure rate by credit category 
 Prime Alt-A Subprime Unknown 
  5,728,732  2,155,354  3,670,613  401,860  
NEGAMSTATUSIND 14.30% 7.60% 0.20% 4.30% 
ORIGINATORNAME 25.60% 26.70% 24.90% 4.20% 
BALLOONSTATUSIND 38.20% 46.30% 36.40% 63.90% 
COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC 72.30% 69.00% 60.40% 28.90% 
DOCTYPESUMMARY 77.30% 72.90% 57.50% 32.10% 
IOSTATUSIND 82.10% 77.00% 53.20% 29.80% 
LIENTYPE 90.10% 89.50% 64.30% 56.80% 
FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC 95.80% 87.90% 73.40% 21.60% 
ORIGAPPRAISALVALUECALC 87.10% 82.90% 85.50% 62.30% 
PURPOSETYPE 89.70% 85.50% 91.80% 82.70% 
OCCTYPE 92.50% 87.90% 93.00% 86.20% 
ORIGINTRTCALC 93.40% 95.40% 96.80% 98.70% 
PROPTYPE 96.70% 96.00% 98.10% 86.10% 
ORIGLTVRATIOCALC 98.20% 95.40% 97.10% 91.90% 
INTRTTYPESUMMARY 98.50% 99.20% 98.50% 91.70% 
ORIGINALBALCALC 100.00% 99.90% 99.80% 99.5 % 
 
Table 1.6 shows, based upon lender classifications, that the disclosure rate for 
FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC is the lowest (73.4%) for subprime loans and highest (95.8%) 
for prime loans. The other fields that are missing the most are also concentrated among subprime 
loans. For 10 out of 16 variables, the disclosure rate is the lowest for subprime mortgages. The 
spread between the highest and lowest disclosure is the largest (28.9%) for IOSTATUSIND, which 
is followed by LIENTYPE (25.8%). There is the smallest difference in disclosure rate between 
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prime and subprime sectors for ORIGINATORNAME (0.7%). However, generally speaking, the 
disclosure is the most likely for prime and the least likely for subprime mortgages. Such patterns 
support the notion that reporting is associated with credit risk. I explore that hypothesis more 
formally in the next section. 
1.5 Initial evidence of selection bias in disclosure and ex-post mortgage performance 
I next investigate how disclosure affects the post-securitization performance. Table 1.7 presents 
information on each risk factor used in my analysis.  
Table 1.7. Summary statistics 
Variable N N Miss Min Max Mean Std Dev 
FICO 7,135,077 612,616 302 850 669.276 73.127 
Combined-Lien LTV 5,734,628 2,013,065 1 149.7 80.982 16.567 
Simple LTV 7,631,887 115,806 1 150 76.957 13.660 
 
Interest rate type  Lien type  Doc type 
ARM 65.87%  First 100.00%  Full 33.81% 
FRM 33.94%  Junior 0.00%  Non-full 48.11% 
Unknown 0.19%  Unknown 0.00%  Unknown 18.08% 
        
Balloon type  IO type  Neg Am type 
Yes 9.46%  Yes 26.74%  Yes 11.72% 
No 26.87%  No 56.94%  No 0.00% 
Unknown 63.67%  Unknown 16.32%  Unknown 88.28% 
 
I again limit my sample to 7,747,693 verifiable first-lien loans securitized during 2005-2007.  As 
expected, substantial amount of loans are missing numerical and categorical risk factors. For 
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example, CLTVs are not reported for 2,103,075 (27.1%) loans. The missing rate hits 88.3% for 
NEGAMSTATUSIND. 
Tables 1.8.1 and 1.8.2 show the marginal effects estimates from logit regressions of mortgage default 
on the loan characteristics and risk factors. I report specifications for a two-year default horizon as 
well as a four-year default horizon. The t-statistics appear in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. 
The dependent variable is 1 if the mortgage in the pool defaults within two years after origination 
and 0 otherwise.34 A mortgage is defined to default if it is seriously delinquent. Following the 
definition of serious delinquency by Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)35, a mortgage 
is seriously delinquent if the loan becomes 60 or more days past due according to the Mortgage 
Bankers Association (MBA) definition (that is, 60 days after the missed payment date or 90 days 
after the last received payment was due) as defined by the BBx performance variable 
MBADELINQUENCYSTATUS=“6” in the BBx date.36 
Unlike previous research, I allow unreported data to enter into the specification using dummy 
variables for “unknown” if such a condition exists. In particular, 
FICOSCOREORIGINATIONCALC and COMBINEDLIENLTVCALC, two most important 
continuous risk factors, are broken down to several ranges to incorporate missing dummies into the 
model. 
                                                          
34 Note that I do not account for loans that may have defaulted and been removed from trusts according to 
substitution clauses common in securitizations in this period. While that is another important element of 
potential bias in the securitized loan data there is, again, no specific reporting of such repurchases so that I 
leave imputing such repurchases as a topic for future research.  
35 See http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/mortgage-metrics-
q1-2009/definitions-and-methods-2009-1-quarter.html 




Table 1.8.1. Two-year performance logit regression including undisclosed loans  
DV = 1 if the mortgage defaults anytime within 2 years from origination; 0 otherwise 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
FICO unknown (d) 0.0634*** 0.0722*** 0.0740*** 
 (80.597) (90.306) (92.271) 
CLTV unknown (d) 0.1193*** 0.1281*** 0.1252*** 
 (244.750) (259.706) (245.217) 
Doc unknown (d)  0.0271*** 0.0356*** 
  (60.788) (75.167) 
Balloon unknown (d)   0.0002 
   (0.563) 
IO unknown (d)   -0.0300*** 
   (-72.826) 
FICO < 620 (d) 0.1971*** 0.2319*** 0.2304*** 
 (451.224) (495.373) (474.560) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) 0.1250*** 0.1358*** 0.1324*** 
 (324.887) (349.463) (333.444) 
80 ≤ CLTV < 100 (d) 0.1097*** 0.1139*** 0.1121*** 
 (261.827) (271.811) (267.535) 
100 ≤ CLTV (d) 0.2047*** 0.2126*** 0.2063*** 
 (330.525) (343.803) (331.262) 
ARM (d) 0.0885*** 0.0855*** 0.0801*** 
 (312.315) (299.839) (275.739) 
Low doc  0.0664*** 0.0656*** 
  (202.337) (199.993) 
Balloon (d)   0.0579*** 
   (107.073) 
IO (d)   0.0146*** 
   (42.866) 
Originated before 2005 (d) -0.1685*** -0.1655*** -0.1583*** 
 (-583.641) (-561.642) (-501.921) 
Originated in 2005 (d) -0.1948*** -0.1913*** -0.1814*** 
 (-519.394) (-510.863) (-472.894) 
Originated in 2006 (d) -0.0596*** -0.0594*** -0.0590*** 
 (-159.214) (-159.106) (-159.485) 
pseudo R-sq 0.1258 0.1314 0.1347 





Table 1.8.2. Four-year performance logit regression including undisclosed loans  
DV = 1 if the mortgage defaults anytime within 4 years from origination; 0 otherwise 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
FICO unknown (d) 0.0654*** 0.0874*** 0.0859*** 
 (89.078) (116.185) (114.511) 
CLTV unknown (d) 0.1196*** 0.1380*** 0.1236*** 
 (244.393) (282.640) (242.725) 
Doc unknown (d)  -0.0049*** 0.0136*** 
  (-9.856) (25.641) 
Balloon unknown (d)   -0.0300*** 
   (-76.000) 
IO unknown (d)   -0.0683*** 
   (-143.718) 
FICO < 620 (d) 0.1539*** 0.1984*** 0.2004*** 
 (349.933) (422.170) (414.586) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) 0.1252*** 0.1414*** 0.1386*** 
 (301.844) (341.304) (328.966) 
80 ≤ CLTV < 100 (d) 0.1436*** 0.1484*** 0.1466*** 
 (325.348) (337.088) (334.566) 
100 ≤ CLTV (d) 0.2297*** 0.2362*** 0.2259*** 
 (386.271) (400.990) (379.394) 
ARM (d) 0.1120*** 0.1098*** 0.1029*** 
 (329.277) (321.161) (296.054) 
Low doc  0.0963*** 0.0958*** 
  (252.833) (252.093) 
Balloon (d)   0.0428*** 
   (68.859) 
IO (d)   0.0210*** 
   (53.492) 
Originated before 2005 (d) -0.2439*** -0.2354*** -0.2199*** 
 (-586.435) (-545.858) (-470.735) 
Originated in 2005 (d) -0.1901*** -0.1840*** -0.1680*** 
 (-397.015) (-382.701) (-339.736) 
Originated in 2006 (d) -0.0288*** -0.0288*** -0.0270*** 
 (-59.034) (-59.226) (-55.605) 
pseudo R-sq 0.0960 0.1044 0.1089 




As seen in Table 1.8.1, loans with unknown values are riskier than the safest categories of each 
attribute, on average, although they are not as risky as the next riskiest cohort. It is particularly 
interesting to look at the disclosure of FICO scores and CLTV ratios – two of the most widely 
considered data items for risk analysis of mortgages. Across all of the models, an unreported FICO 
score is associated with a 6.3% - 8.7% greater chance of default than if it were reported to have been 
greater than 680, or slightly lower – by itself – than if the loan was associated with a reported FICO 
between 620 and 680.  This suggests the possibility that credit scores are less likely to be reported 
for the mortgages with intermediate level of FICO scores (approximately with the mean of 680). 
This may imply the convexity of the curve on the coordinates whose X- and Y-axes represent FICO 
scores and the corresponding disclosure rate respectively. This is an arguably reasonable disclosure 
pattern for two reasons: 1) sponsors may be more willing to convey the FICO score if it is high; 2) 
mortgages for borrowers with low FICO scores may have riskier other loan attributes than those 
with higher FICO scores, and MBS investors would demand the disclosure of FICO more 
aggressively if other loan attributes indicate higher risk. 
When CLTV is unreported, there is an 11.9% - 13.8% greater chance of default than if it were 
reported to be lowest range of CLTV lower than 80%, slightly higher than if the CLTV were 
between 80 and 100 for the two-year default model, and slightly lower than if the CLTV were 
between 80 and 100 for the four-year default model. Given the association between the omission of 
CLTV and the intermediate level of ex-post default risk, it is also possible to make an inference that 
extremely low or high CLTV ratios are more likely to be reported than intermediate level of CLTV. 
Similarly, Doc unknown is associated with a 1.4-3.6% greater chance of default than a full doc loan 
except for Model 2 in Table 1.8.2, still lower than disclosed Low Doc loan (6.6-9.6% greater chance 





Table 1.9: Performance forecast ratios for the two-year and four-year models with and without loans with unknown characteristics using 
logit specifications – comparison between predicted and actual likelihood of default 
 
 
Actually current Actually default Total Actually current Actually default Total
5,749,493 1,223,910 6,973,403 692,606 233,901 926,507
82.45% 17.55% 100% 74.75% 25.25% 100%
226,187 229,792 455,979 55,134 62,090 117,224
49.60% 50.40% 100% 47.03% 52.97% 100%
Total 5,975,680 1,453,702 7,429,382 Total 747,740 295,991 1,043,731
80.43% 19.57% 100% 71.64% 28.36% 100%
80.48% 72.31%
Actually current Actually default Total Actually current Actually default Total
4,565,831 1,662,992 6,228,823 430,920 220,727 651,647
73.30% 26.70% 100% 66.13% 33.87% 100%
544,719 757,774 1,302,493 167,872 235,836 403,708
41.82% 58.18% 100% 41.58% 58.42% 100%
Total 5,110,550 2,420,766 7,531,316 Total 598,792 456,563 1,055,355
67.86% 32.14% 100% 56.74% 43.26% 100%
70.69% 63.18%
2 year default logit regression including unknowns
% correct prediction % correct prediction
4 year default logit regression including unknowns
2 year default logit regression without unknowns




















The results seem to indicate that the unknown loan characteristics are more associated with higher-
quality loans, but not the highest quality loans. If loans with unknown loan characteristics are 
systematically less likely to fail than others in disclosed risk categories, studies that omit such loans 
are biased toward a riskier cohort.  
If the loans with unknown characteristics add explanatory value to the model, even left specified as 
unknown, modeling mortgage default without including such loans could have implications for 
performance forecast accuracy. Running the two-year model without the loans with unknown 
characteristics has little effect upon adjusted R-squared, but including such loans substantially 
increases the pseudo R-squared in the four-year model.  
Of course, pseudo R-squared is not a good measure for comparison between two models with 
different number of regressors and different number of observations. Thus, in Table 1.9, I present 
comparisons of forecast accuracy from my two-year and four-year models with and without the 
loans with unknown characteristics. It is immediately apparent that including the loans with 
unknown characteristics increases the forecast accuracy, from 72.31% in the two-year model without 
loans with unknown characteristics to 80.48% in the two-year model with loans with unknown 
characteristics. Similarly, forecast accuracy in the four-year model increases from 63.18% to 70.69%. 
Forecast accuracies are also measured with Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) in OLS regressions. 
As shown in Table 1.10, RMSEs are also smaller when unknowns are controlled. Model 3 has a 
higher RMSE difference than Model 1, showing that the more “unknown” variables controlled for, 
the better.   
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Table 1.10: Performance forecast ratios for the two-year and four-year models with and without 
loans with unknown characteristics using OLS specifications – comparison of root mean squared 
errors 
 2 year default OLS  4 year default OLS 
  With unknowns Without unknowns  With unknowns Without unknowns 
Model 1 38.4% 38.4%  44.0% 44.7% 
Model 2 38.3% 38.6%  43.8% 45.0% 
Model 3 38.1% 41.9%   43.6% 47.1% 
 
Such results confirm that models built to accommodate loans with unknown characteristics can be 
expected to perform better than others, most likely because they address – even if incompletely – 
the sample bias imputed from omitting such loans. 
1.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I explore the causes of the financial crisis by examining how loan-level information 
was disclosed and reported during the pre-crisis period. Using representative loan-level data from 
trustees, I show that important loan-level attributes are not reported for substantial non-random 
portion of securitized loans. Thus, the loan-level sample used in many popular studies may not 
properly represent the population. In such cases, it is becoming apparent in “big data” research that 
observational biases can be crucial to academic and policy research on the financial crisis.  
I also provide empirical evidence that loan-level disclosure is correlated across data fields and that 
loan performance is worse than the safest loans and better than the riskiest ones when the loan 
characteristics are not reported. These findings have two important implications. First, if we blindly 
drop the mortgages with missing values for major risk factors, then the resulting sample may not be 
random leading to biased estimations. Second, current regulatory regimes do not address improving 
disclosure practices in ways that can alleviate this data limitations. Therefore, the SEC is probably 
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right to pursue increased reporting pursuant to Reg AB II, which will most likely increase investors’ 
ability to model accurately loan performance when investing in future mortgage products. 
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CHAPTER 2. SELECTION BIAS AND THE ESTIMATION OF 
SPONSOR AFFILIATIONS IN MORTGAGE RISK  
2.1 Introduction 
The mortgage securitization process consists of multiple transactions conducted by several 
institutions that are not necessarily affiliated with each other. For example, for transferring 
mortgages into the trust, there are typically three entities involved in this single step. As a diagram 
from the prospectus supplement for BSMF 2006-SL1 shows in Figure 2.1, as the sponsor, EMC 
acquired or aggregated mortgages from originators. As the depositor, Bear Stearns Asset Backed 
Securities I built up a “bankruptcy firewall” between EMC and the BSMF Trust 2006-SL1 that 
issued bonds, establishing a two-stage transfer and thus completing “true sale” of assets37 Since the 
depositor and the issuer are limited purpose entities created by the sponsor, this paper refers to the 
three of the entities jointly as the securitizer.  
One important characteristic of securitization is that banks often outsource the underwriting 
function (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Policymakers were cognizant of the possibility that affiliations 
among various parties in securitizations may have substantial influences on market outcomes. 
Hence, “Affiliations and Certain Relationships and Related Transactions” is one of the basic 
disclosure items in Regulation AB (Reg AB) adopted by Securities Exchange Commission in 2004.38   
                                                          
37 The sale of mortgages from the sponsor to the trust should be “complete and true” for the trust to be 
designated as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC). Mortgages in the REMIC trust are 
isolated from the risk of seizure by creditors in the event of sponsor’s bankruptcy. Issuance of bonds though 
REMIC trusts enables sponsoring banks to enjoy the benefits of inexpensive off-balance sheet debt because 
the cost of securitized debt financing does not contain a bankruptcy risk premium. See Moody’s Investors 
Service (2002) and Gorton and Souleles (2007). 









There is also growing academic interest in affiliations. Researchers have examined how the frictions 
arising from affiliation status contributed to the recent crisis. For example, Demiroglu and James 
(2012) argue that banks engaged in less screening of applicants for mortgages they planned to sell to 
unaffiliated securitizers. Titman and Tsyplakov (2010) document that originators cherry-picked less 
risky mortgages to deposit in their own trusts. The previous analyses of originator-sponsor 
affiliations rely on the assumption that the identities of originators are correctly reported, and the 
sample whose affiliation information is available truthfully represents the population.  
My paper identifies two sources of bias associated with this assumption. First, the originator 
information available from prospectus supplements and loan-level datasets is subject to 
measurement error in that institutions reported as originators may not truly be originators. There are 
likely multiple institutions such as brokers and loan officers who handle applicants at the front end 
of origination process39, banks that temporarily keep mortgages in their portfolio, and institutions 
specialized in purchase and aggregation of mortgages prior to securitization.  
The set of originators reported at the deal level may be erroneous. Reg AB requires securitizers to 
disclose in the prospectus supplements originators who provide 10% or more of the mortgage 
pool,40 however Reg AB provides little guidance with regard to which institution in the origination 
process should be reported. Hence, sponsors usually report the loan providers they directly 
transacted with as the originators in their prospectus supplements regardless of whether the loan 
providers actually closed the mortgages or not. Measurement error for originator identification may 
be more serious in loan-level data sets voluntarily reported by various institutions across the 
securitization process. Due to lack of regulation, the reported value for originator name variable 
                                                          
39 In most of the prospectus supplements, the institutions reported as originators are documented to acquire 
from third-party originators as well as originate mortgages in the pool. 
40 See the section concerning originators in p1538 of 33-8518FR. 
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could be a broker, a correspondent lender, an originating arm of the sponsor, or even the sponsor 
itself. For example, sponsors like IndyMac and Countrywide consider correspondent lenders as an 
in-house origination channel while the other sponsors like Wells Fargo treat them as unaffiliated 
third party originators. The impossibility of identifying originators imply that academics cannot 
rigorously test the frictions on the part of originators. Institutions identifiable from prospectus 
supplements and loan-level data sets are loan providers who transfer mortgages to affiliated or 
unaffiliated sponsors. It is these loan providers that I examine in the analysis of how mortgages are 
allocated between affiliated and unaffiliated securitizations depending on their credit risk. 
The second source of bias is the possibility that the distributions of major variables are truncated in 
a non-random fashion. First, the sample of mortgages whose affiliation status is available from loan-
level data sets may fail to represent the population. As shown later in this paper, regardless of the 
true affiliations, sponsors tend to report themselves rather than unaffiliated small lenders as the loan 
providers more often for ex-ante riskier mortgages.41 A lack of consideration for the selective 
disclosure of loan providers by sponsors may lead to a biased estimation for the relationship 
between the default risk of a mortgage and its sponsor-loan provider affiliation. Second, a variety of 
risk factors and loan attributes are typically controlled in the loan performance model. Academics 
often drop all the mortgages whose characteristics variables are missing, potentially resulting in 
another sample selection problem.  
This paper aims to explore how the measurement error and the incidental truncation of the identity 
of loan providers impact the study of two empirical problems: how the affiliation between sponsor 
and loan provider is associated with 1) loan attributes like FICO, LTV, etc. as the proxy of ex-ante 
                                                          
41 They may do this because they arguably seek to exploit their reputation capital in order to facilitate the sale 




default risk; and 2) post-securitization loan performance as the proxy of ex-post default risk. These 
two problems are important because they provide clues for two hypotheses of whether banks 
cherry-pick less risky mortgages for their own securitizations exploiting: 1) their private 
information42; and 2) public information43 for mortgage quality.  
Using a unique dataset where the identities of sponsors and loan-providers are hand-collected, and 
linked to loan attributes in BBx data (BBx)44, I show that sponsor-loan provider affiliation is 
seemingly associated with higher ex-ante and ex-post default risk if the affiliation variable is naively 
constructed based on the identity of institution reported as the originator in the loan-level data. To 
check the validity of these results, I construct and use the actual affiliation between the sponsor and 
the true loan provider identified with a simple algorithm through which the number of correctly 
identified loan providers increases from 973,298 to 3,326,077, or from 20.3% to 69.4% of the 
population of mortgages privately securitized in 2006. When the missing or erroneous values for 
loan provider identities are properly back-filled and corrected, I show that loan providers channel 
ex-ante riskier mortgages to their own trusts significantly less often than to unaffiliated securitizers. 
This result that loan providers cherry-pick ex-ante less risky mortgages for their affiliated 
securitizations also holds in control function method, or two-step procedure (Heckman, 1976; 
Heckman 1979; Lee 1982) where sponsor’s selective disclosure of loan providers is explicitly 
addressed. 
                                                          
42 As suggested in Stein (2002), institutions may take advantage of “soft information” for mortgage quality 
that cannot be transferred to the counterparty of mortgage transactions. 
43 The public information includes loan-level data available to investing public as documented in Piskorski, 
Seru, and Witkin (2013). 
44 BBx is one of the major loan-level data marketed by BlackBox Logic. For details, see 
http://www.bbxlogic.com/bbx-logic-US-RMBS-non-agency-solutions.php.  More information for the 
coverage and structure of BBx is provided in the following section.  
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I also show there is a dramatic discrepancy in correlation between ex-post default risk and the 
sponsor-loan provider affiliations depending on treatments of missing and erroneous values for 
affiliation variable. If the originator name variable is naively used for the construction of affiliation 
between loan provider and the sponsor, then affiliation seemingly increases the likelihood of default. 
In contrast, with the sample where the loan providers are correctly identified and backfilled, I show 
that mortgages perform significantly better for affiliated loans than for unaffiliated ones. More 
interestingly, if the missing indicators for each risk factor are introduced into the model, so if the 
sample is not sliced and diced based on the availability of variables, then loan providers with capacity 
of securitizations are shown to transfer ex-post riskier mortgages to their own shelves than to 
unaffiliated sponsors, which is different from Demiroglu and James’ (2012) result that sponsoring 
ability has little effects on mortgage performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides detailed information about 
the structure and coverage of loan-level data provided by BBx. Section 3 illustrates how loan 
providers are disclosed and reported in the prospectus supplements and BBx. Section 4 introduces a 
simple algorithm for the calculation of the affiliation between sponsor and true loan provider. 
Section 5 contrasts the difference in empirical results depending on whether the missing and 
measurement error problems for the affiliation variable are addressed or not. Section 5 also provide 
empirical models and results that the affiliation between loan provider and sponsor is associated 
with lower ex-ante and ex-post default risk. Section 7 concludes. 
2.2 BBx data 
I examine how mortgage quality varies with the affiliation between loan providers and sponsors 
using the loan-level data compiled by Blackbox Logic, LLC (BBx). If we are free from concerns 
about selective omissions for major risk factors, BBx would be enough to be referred as “Big data” 
for securitized mortgages. In this section, I show that BBx represents sufficiently large portion of 
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the private-label mortgage market in terms of the number of loan-level variables, geographical 
coverage, origination amount, and outstanding balance. BBx contains extensive loan-level 
information for mortgages securitized by private institutions.  Borrowers’ credit scores and mortgage 
underwriting characteristics at the time of origination such as loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, loan 
balance, initial interest rate, insurance information, a variety of indicators related to purpose, 
occupancy, documentation, maturity, etc. are available from BBx. Also, BBx provides time-varying 
information on the history of delinquency, payoff status, and details regarding critical events such as 
modification, prepayment, and loss from liquidation. As of December 2013, BBx includes the 
information on 7,480 deals, 21,656,677 loans, and 708,373,906 remittance records. 
Figure 2.2. Distribution of the properties used as collateral against the mortgages in BBx. 
 
BBx has reasonable coverage of the markets for Jumbo A, Subprime and Alt-A mortgages with 
senior and junior lien positions as well as prime mortgages. In Figure 2.2, I show how much BBx 
covers across core based statistical areas (CBSAs) in the United States. To identify the geographical 
distribution of BBx properties, I merge the location information of properties in BBx and 2003 
cartographic boundary files from Census Bureau. Black areas are CBSAs BBx does not cover. Grey 
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areas represent the CBSAs where BBx properties are located. White areas are not part of a CBSA. 
As presented in Figure 2.2, virtually every CBSA (920 out of 933) is represented in BBx.  
 
Table 2.1. Comparison of origination amount between BBx and the market 
 Total Non-agency BBx 
% of  
total population 
% of  
non-agency sector 
2005 $3,120 $1,940 $1,146 36.73% 59.07% 
2006 $2,980 $1,910 $1,065 35.74% 55.76% 
Notes: Figures are in billion. 
Table 2.1 contrasts the dollar amount of mortgage originations across the entire mortgage industry, 
non-agency sector, and BBx in both 2005 and 2006.45 The 2005 and 2006 sum of origination amount 
in BBx is respectively 1.146 and 1.065 trillion dollars, which accounts for 59.07% and 55.76% of 
non-agency sector. 




BBx BBx coverage 
Dec-05 $2,937 $1,340 45.62% 
Dec-06 $2,755 $2,061 74.81% 
Dec-07 $2,936 $2,393 81.51% 
Dec-08 $2,586 $2,066 79.89% 
Dec-09 $2,219 $1,722 77.60% 
Dec-10 $1,899 $1,420 74.78% 
Jun-11 $1,788 $1,304 72.93% 
 
                                                          




Table 2.2 compares the mortgage debt outstanding over time between the private securitization 
industry and BBx. The figures for non-agency sector volume is from the Federal Reserve Board 
Statistics and Historical data. Outstanding debt amount in BBx is self-calculated. To summarize, 
45.62% to 81.51% of outstanding debt amount is covered in BBx from the first quarter of 2005 to 
the second quarter of 2011. 
2.3 Practices of disclosing originators 
2.3.1 Deal-level disclosure of originators in prospectus supplements 
In response to the need to increase investor protection and facilitate the efficient operation of MBS 
market, on December 15 2004, the SEC approved Reg AB, which establishes registration, disclosure, 
and reporting requirements for securitized pool of mortgages. Prospectus disclosures were required 
to be compliant by Dec 31, 2005, and all shelf registrations were required to conform by Mar 31, 
2006.  
Specifically, Reg AB requires registrants to disclose the identity of originators who could be 
important in evaluating risk. According to the disclosure requirements for originators set forth in 
Item 1110, securitizers need to report the identity of institutions who provide 10% or more of the 
pool assets and further information46 for those who provide 20% or more. This “step-ladder 
threshold for disclosure” is the result of the SEC’s effort to balance the public need for information 
with the risk of over-disclosure.47 It is notable that there may be multiple institutions within the 
origination process, and Reg AB provides little guidance about which institution should be reported 
as the originator. Hence, securitizers usually report the identity of loan providers they directly 
                                                          
46 Additional items are required to be disclosed for originators larger than 20% including organization forms, underwriting 
criteria, unfavorable legal proceedings, information of affiliated transaction parties, etc. 
47 See Walworth, Novomisle, and Wetzler, “The Role of Reg AB”, New York Law Journal, Jun. 14, 2010. 
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transact with, and do not trace back the entire mortgage supply chain to identify the original 
mortgagees.  
The most common practice is loan providers are reported as the originator if the outstanding 
balance of mortgages they provide is larger than 10% of the aggregate principal balance on the cut-
off date. Figure 2.3 provides an example of how loan providers are reported by Deutsche Bank in its 
prospectus supplement for ACE 2006-HE2. Argent, Chapel, and CIT are reported to provide 
33.81%, 10.77%, and 10.76% of the pool assets while the loan providers smaller than 10% are 
categorized to be “various originators” and remain undisclosed. 
Figure 2.3. Excerpt for disclosure of loan providers in the prospectus supplement for ACE 2006-
HE2 
 
Even though Reg AB only requires disclosure of loan providers larger than 10%, some securitizers 
report the distribution of loan providers in full regardless of the loan amount they provide. Figure 
2.4 presents how BancCap Advisors reported loan providers in its prospectus supplement for the 
deal BASIC 2006-1. Flexpoint Funding, Maribella, and Oak Street are disclosed as loan providers 
even though their dollar contributions to the composition of the deal are just 3.76%, 8.58%, and 
0.46% respectively, which is much smaller than 10%. 
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Figure 2.4. Excerpt for disclosure of loan providers in the prospectus supplement for BASIC 2006-1 
 
Some securitizers purchase mortgages from a single loan provider. In that case, the name for the 
trust often includes the name of the single loan provider. For example, in ABFC 2006-OPT2, OPT 
refers to Option One which provided 100% of mortgages in the deal. Figure 2.5 presents how 
Option One is reported to be the loan provider in ABFC 2006-OPT2. Notably, the prospectus 
supplement documents that Option One acquired as well as originated the mortgages it provided to 
ABFC 2006-OPT2, implying that Option One may not be the true originator for some mortgages. 
 
Figure 2.5. Excerpt for disclosure of loan provider in the prospectus supplement for ABFC 2006-
OPT2 
 
In some securitizations, sponsors themselves originate loans. As shown in Figure 2.6 for WFMBS 
2006-1, Wells Fargo is not only the sponsor but also the loan provider which accounts for 64.42% 
of the underlying mortgage assets. Loan providers for the remaining 33.58% were not disclosed 
since, individually, their sizes did not exceed the 10% Reg AB threshold. According to the 
information regarding origination channel, this 33.58% came from unaffiliated correspondents. Still, 
Wells Fargo actually originated 41.58% of the pool through its retail loan officers, while 22.84% 
were acquired from brokers through the wholesale channel, the identities of which are not disclosed. 
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In this section, I presented how prospectus supplements provide deal-level information about the 
identity of loan providers who are not necessarily originators who underwrite and create mortgages 
at the front-end of securitization process. Deal-level patterns of reporting loan providers show why 




Figure 2.6. Excerpt for disclosure of loan provider in the prospectus supplement for WFMBS 2006-1 
 
The distribution of loan providers presented in the prospectus supplements is a deal-level 
information, however it is still useful even for loan-level analysis. I explore the disclosure practices 
and limitations of loan-level information about loan providers in the next section. 
2.3.2 Loan-level disclosure of originators in trustee data 
A mortgage’s originator is defined to be disclosed at the loan level if the mortgage’s originator name 
is not missing in the loan-level data. Most of the loan-level information has been collected from 
trustees by data vendors such as BBx from BlackBox Logic, LLC., ABSnet Loan of Lewtan48, and 
                                                          
48 Lewtan is the subsidiary of Standard & Poor’s. 
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LoanPerformance from First American CoreLogic. These trustee datasets consist of two tiers of 
loan-level information: “loan tapes” and “remittance data” (Mason, Imerman, and Lee, 2014).  
Reg AB does not require any disclosure of originators at the loan level. Therefore, the variable of 
originator name (ORIGINATORNAME in BBx) frequently indicates loan providers. Furthermore, 
the originator has been disclosed for a substantially small amount of mortgages. Figure 2.7 shows 
what portion of loan providers have been disclosed for mortgages depending on whether their 
trustee is Wells Fargo or not.49 For the mortgages whose loan level information is obtained from 
Wells Fargo, the disclosure of loan providers dramatically increased from 2.1% in July 2006 to 
62.2% in August 2006 while the disclosure rates remained relatively low at around 10 to 20% for the 
other trustees. This implies that the loan-level disclosure of loan providers may substantially vary 
across different trustees. 
 
Figure 2.7. The disclosure rate for loan provider identity in BBx by trustees 
 
                                                          
49 The “other trustees” includes Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of New York, LaSalle Bank, US 


















Due to the absence of regulation and voluntary nature of loan-level disclosure, sponsors can choose 
to report themselves or unaffiliated loan providers as the originator, or even choose not to disclose 
loan-level origination information. Table 2.3 shows that Taylor, Bean, and Whitaker (TBW) chose 
three loan-level disclosure options for the deals it securitized in 2006. In the first half of 2006, it 
rarely reported loan provider identities for securitizations TBW 2006-1, 2, and 3 as opposed to TBW 
2006-4, 5, and 6 securitized during the second half of 2006 where originator name is missing for 
none of the mortgages. In BBx, TBW reported itself as the single originator for TBW 2006-4 and 6, 
however it fully disclosed all 1,114 brokers who provided loans into TBW 2006-5. This contrasts 
with information provided in the prospectus supplements for TBW securitizations, where TBW is 
always reported to be the single originator. 
Table 2.3. Loan-level disclosure by Taylor, Bean, and Whitaker in BBx 
Deal name 
# of originators 
disclosed 





TBW 2006-1 0 1196 N/A 30-Mar-06 
TBW 2006-2 7 2763 TBW only 27-Apr-06 
TBW 2006-3 0 3149 N/A 30-Jun-06 
TBW 2006-4 1738 1738 TBW only 30-Aug-06 
TBW 2006-5 3001 3001 TBW and 1,114 brokers 26-Oct-06 
TBW 2006-6 2565 2565 TBW only 21-Dec-06 
 
Other sponsors have a variety of reporting patterns for ORIGINATORNAME in BBx. Figure 2.8 
presents the number of different values for ORIGINATORNAME within a deal. It is immediately 
obvious that majority of sponsors do not report ORIGINATORNAME at all in BBx. 
ORIGINATORNAME is missing for every mortgage in the 774 deals. The group of sponsors who 
make no reports for ORIGINATORNAME includes Countrywide, Residential Funding 
Corporation, IndyMac, WaMu, and Wells Fargo.  
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For the 80 deals securitized by Lehman Brothers, Greenwich, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, 
and UBS, sponsors report themselves or other loan providers as the single originator. For the 66 
deals securitized by EMC, Deutsch Bank, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Goldman Sachs, sponsors 
report more than 30 institutions as originators due to the fact that they usually operate conduits 
through which they securitize mortgages from numerous brokers and correspondents. 
 
Figure 2.8. Distribution of the number of disclosed loan providers within a deal securitized in 2006 
 
The loan-level disclosure practices suggest that the variable of originator name in the loan-level data 
alone may not be helpful for calculating sponsor affiliations. In the next section, I introduce a simple 
algorithm which actively employs information about loan providers not only from loan-level data 
but also from deal-level prospectus supplements. 
2.4 Calculation of true affiliation between loan provider and sponsor 
As presented in the previous section for disclosure practices, the institutions reported to be 
originators are often loan providers who sold mortgages acting as a middleman between original 
mortgagees and sponsors, therefore they are not necessarily originators. Main purpose of this paper 
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securitizations. However, it is possible to calculate the affiliation between loan providers and 
sponsors only when both of them are identified. Sponsor is easily identifiable from prospectus 
supplements50, while identity of loan providers is missing for the majority of mortgages in BBx. This 
may make the sample of mortgages whose ORIGINATORNAME are reported not representative 
of the population. Therefore, in the examination of how affiliation choices are made by loan 
providers, it is important to consider the possibility that the exclusion of observations with no 
ORIGINATORNAME from the sample leads to bias.   
One way to deal with potential bias is to reconstruct the population by backfilling and correcting 
ORIGINATORNAME in the loan level data. In order to recover the identity of loan providers, I 
develop a simple algorithm. First, identification is straightforward for the deals whose sponsors 
purchase mortgages from a single loan provider. In this case, the single loan provider’s name is 
available from prospectus supplements or even from their trust name. Among 1,195 deals 
securitized in 2006, at least for 553 deals, sponsors acquired 2,486,352 (51.86%) mortgages from a 
single loan provider. For example, for ABFC 2006-OPT1 securitized by Bank of America, the single 
loan provider is Option One. The five largest sponsors in this category are Countrywide, Lehman 
Brothers, IndyMac, Long Beach, and Greenwich, and the top five single loan providers are 
Countrywide, New Century, Option One, First Franklin, and Long Beach.  
Second, if the value for ORIGINATORNAME in BBx is identical to one of the institutions 
reported as the originators in prospectus supplements for the deals with multiple loan providers, 
then I treat the institution listed in ORIGINATORNAME to be the loan provider. Notably, I do 
not directly use ORIGINATORNAME to identify loan providers because it may indicate the other 
                                                          




institution who sold mortgages to the loan provider. According to the prospectus supplement for 
ABFC 2006-HE1, Accredited Lenders, Ameriquest, New Century, Option One, and WMC provided 
98% of the loans in the pool. BBx reports 6,791 (88%) loans were from those five loan providers, 
implying that the other institutions in earlier part of mortgage supply chain were misreported as one 
of those five loan providers for the other 10%. 
Table 2.4. The distribution of originators and primary servicers 
 % Origination in Pro Supps % Servicers in BBx 
Bank of America 3.16% 2.25% 
GMAC 4.08% 12.55% 
National City 13.25% 3.63% 
PHH 0.11% 0.08% 
RFC 3.84% 3.19% 
SunTrust 2.48% 1.89% 
Washington Mutual 16.86% 2.33% 
Wells Fargo 56.22% 58.04% 
PNC  5.53% 
JP Morgan Chase  10.52% 
 
Third, if the value for SERVICERNAMECALC, the variable for the identity of primary servicer, in 
BBx is identical to one of the originators reported in prospectus supplements, then I treat the 
institution in SERVICERNAMECALC to be the loan provider. This method could be justified by 
the industry practices that loan providers often maintain their servicing rights even after they sell 
mortgages to the sponsor.  For the deal, ACE 2006-SD3 securitized by Deutsche Bank, 
ORIGINAORNAME in BBx is 100% missing, however IndyMac and Washington Mutual are 
reported to provide 21% of the pool in the prospectus supplement, and they service 7% of the pool 
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according to BBx.  Moreover, the distributions of originators in the prospectus supplements and 
SERVICERNAMECALC in BBx are sometimes relatively close to one another.  
Table 2.4 presents the distribution of originators reported in the prospectus supplements and 
SERVICERANMECALC in BBx for BAFC 2006-1. It is immediately obvious that the two 
distributions are substantially similar. WaMu has small share of servicing relative to the amount of 
loans it provided because Chase took over servicing rights after it acquired WaMu in 2008. 
Table 2.5. List of sponsors with no capacity for origination 
Non-originating sponsors N loans % loans 
EMC 342846 23.28 
Goldman Sachs 251760 17.09 
Morgan Stanley 204418 13.88 
Deutsche Bank 198378 13.47 
Greenwich 146944 9.98 
Nomura 73637 5 
Carrington 49113 3.33 
Sutton Funding 35270 2.39 
IXIS 32323 2.19 
Barclays 30631 2.08 
C-BASS 28583 1.94 
Delta Funding 18927 1.29 
Societe Generale 16048 1.09 
Luminent 11949 0.81 
NewCastle 11272 0.77 
Saxon 6247 0.42 
HomeBanc 3908 0.27 
GSC Capital 2776 0.19 
Ocwen 2689 0.18 
CSE Mortgage 2177 0.15 
RWT Holdings 1800 0.12 
BancCap Advisors 1026 0.07 
Total 1472722 100 
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Fourth, I can always treat loan providers and sponsors as unaffiliated so long as the sponsor does 
not have any in-house origination platform. For the sample of mortgages securitized in 2006, 
sponsors with no capacity for origination securitized 1,472,722 (30.7%) loans.  
Table 2.5 presents the list of non-sponsoring originators and their market shares. EMC, Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Greenwich are the five largest sponsors who exclusively 
acquired mortgages on flow or bulk basis from unaffiliated loan providers.  
Fifth, if the institution reported as the originator in BBx or in prospectus supplements is just the 
mortgage acquisition channel of the sponsors, then loan provider is treated to be missing even 
though ORIGINATORNAME is not missing. ORIGINATORNAME indicates conduit or 
purchase programs for 44,664 loans. We can observe this type of loans in the shelves of Bear 
Stearns, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and UBS. Table 2.6 shows how major conduit sponsors 
report ORIGINATORNAME variables in BBx. 
Table 2.6. Disclosure for conduits 
Sponsor Value for ORIGINATORNAME Bloomberg ID for trusts 
EMC Mortgage Corp 
EMC, EMC FLOW, EMC RESIDENTIAL,  
EMC MORTGAGE CORP 
BSABS 2006-HE3, HE4, 
HE10 , SD4, BSMF 2006-
AR3, 4, 5, 8,  
BALTA 2006-8, EMCM 




ASSURANCE PARTNERS BANK 
(CONDUIT), CENDANT CONDUIT, 
FNBA CONDUIT, GREENPOINT 
CONDUIT 
MSM 2006-13AX, 15AX, 
16AX, MSM 2006-12XS, 
15XS, and 17XS 
Goldman Sachs 
Mortgage Company GS CONDUIT 
GSAA 2006-14, 15, 16, 17, 
19, 20, and GSR 2006-8F 
UBS Real Estate 
Securities Conduit, UBS conduit MALT 2006-1, MASL 2006-1 
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Among 4.8 million mortgages securitized in 2006, ORIGINATORNAME is populated only for 
973,298 (20.3%) loans. However, through this simple algorithm, I can confidently identify 3,326,077 
(69.4%) loan providers. Furthermore, I can calculate the affiliation status for 3,904,931 (81.5%) 
loans. 
2.5 Empirical models and results 
The paper examines how loan providers choose between affiliated and unaffiliated securitizations. 
The loan provider’s choice of affiliations can be associated with either ex-ante or ex-post default 
risk. For the relation between sponsor-loan provider affiliation and the ex-ante default risk, I 
examine how various ex-ante risk factors such as FICO, LTV, etc. affect the likelihood of affiliation 
between the loan provider and the sponsor. To answer the question of how the affiliation is related 
to ex-post risk, I estimate the effect of affiliation on the post-securitization mortgage performance. 
I start the empirical analysis of the relation between sponsor-loan provider affiliation and default risk 
with the presentation of summary statistics in Table 2.7. Column 1 shows sample means for major 
attributes for the entire group of 4,793,923 mortgages securitized in 2006. These approximately 4.8 
million mortgages are broken down to two groups based on whether ORIGINATORNAME is 
missing or not in columns 2 and 3.  973,298 mortgages in column 2 are divided again to two groups 
in columns 4 and 5 depending on whether the institution in ORIGINATORNAME is affiliated with 
the sponsor. I identified true loan providers for 3,904,931 mortgages using a simple algorithm 
introduced in section 2.4, which are categorized based on actual affiliation between loan provider 
and sponsor, and accordingly grouped in columns in 6 and 7 in the table. 
Table 2.7 shows interesting variation in risk factors and loan attributes. Average FICO scores are 
higher, and simple LTVs and interest rates are lower when ORIGINATORNAME is reported. The 
risk factors substantially vary depending on the measure of affiliation as well. 
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Table 2.7. Averages for major numeric loan attributes by disclosed affiliation 
 
  (1) Total 
ORIGINATORNAME  
reported 
Reported to be  
affiliated 
Affiliated confirmed 
  (2) Yes (3) No (4) Yes (5) No (6) Yes (7) No 
FICO 668.26 662.44 670.26 661.47 662.66 680.53 653.75 
Simple LTV 68.22% 72.36% 67.17% 70.58% 72.76% 64.91% 71.43% 
Combined-lien LTV 84.96% 83.94% 85.30% 85.35% 83.61% 83.79% 84.42% 
Interest rate 8.00% 8.18% 7.96% 8.50% 8.11% 7.66% 8.39% 
Term 338.2 338.6 338.1 343.3 337.6 345.6 335.2 
Property appraisal value 349127.7 318068.4 356871.8 315225.3 318792.9 384620.8 312779.6 
Loan amount 221701.2 222027.0 221618.1 229673.6 220304.4 238735.1 205542.1 
2nd lien 21.6% 25.0% 20.8% 25.7% 24.8% 22.0% 22.2% 
Low doc 36.1% 44.7% 40.4% 45.6% 44.5% 45.9% 34.3% 
Balloon 21.3% 25.8% 20.1% 24.7% 26.1% 17.9% 26.3% 
IO 20.6% 26.0% 19.2% 26.0% 26.0% 16.0% 20.5% 
Investment loan 9.2% 9.1% 9.2% 10.1% 8.8% 7.9% 7.9% 
Cash-out refinancing 31.3% 29.6% 31.7% 32.4% 29.0% 40.4% 29.2% 
N loans 4,793,923 973,298 3,820,625 178,939 794,359 1,558,176 2,346,755 
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When the institution in ORIGINATORNAME is affiliated with the sponsor, mortgages have lower 
FICO scores, and higher combined-lien LTV and coupon rate. In contrast, FICO scores are higher 
and simple LTVs, combined-lien LTVs, and coupon rates are lower when the loan provider is 
affiliated with the sponsor. This suggests that inferences on the relation between sponsor affiliations 
and ex-ante risk factors may be dramatically different depending on the measure of affiliations. 
2.5.1. Affiliation and ex-ante default risk 
The first empirical question of the paper is how the loan provider’s affiliation choices are affected by 
a variety of loan characteristics. This relation is important because it provides some insight into the 
question of whether loan providers cherry-pick ex-ante less risky mortgages for their own 
securitizations. The variation in average risk factors across different measures of affiliation suggests 
that it may not be desirable to naively use the variable of originator name that is mostly missing in 
the loan-level data sets. Therefore, I explore how and why the empirical relation between the 
affiliation and ex-ante risk factors varies depending on whether the missing problem is addressed or 
not. 
2.5.1.1 Estimation of affiliation determination without consideration of selective disclosure 
I begin the empirical work with the affiliation calculated based on ORIGINATORNAME in BBx 
without backfilling missing values nor correcting incorrect values for ORIGINATORNAME. This 
affiliation variable equals 1 if the institution in ORIGINAOTRNAME transfers the mortgage to its 
affiliated sponsor. I call this affiliation “reported affiliation.” If we naively use the reported 
affiliation, this means we do not effectively address the limitations generally inherent in loan-level 
data sets which lack substantial amount of information in a non-random fashion. 
Table 2.8 shows the results for an OLS regression of reported affiliation on various mortgage risk 
characteristics. The sample is restricted to 726,067 first lien mortgages where 
ORIGINATORNAME in BBx is populated. I focus on first-lien mortgages to correctly measure the 
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effect of combined-lien loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio. The dependent variable equals one if the 
institution in ORIGINATORNAME is affiliated with the sponsor and zero otherwise.  
Table 2.8. One-shot OLS for reported affiliation without consideration of selective disclosure 
DV=1 if the loan provider is reported to be affiliated with the sponsor; 0 otherwise 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FICO < 620 (d) 0.0069*** 0.0148*** 0.0102*** 0.0082*** 
 (6.188) (12.723) (8.500) (6.904) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) -0.0002 0.0049*** 0.0037*** -0.0022** 
 (-0.224) (4.395) (3.293) (-1.964) 
FICO unknown (d) 0.0424*** 0.0824*** 0.0577*** 0.1114*** 
 (10.806) (20.671) (14.504) (27.454) 
80 ≤ CLTV < 100 (d) 0.0171*** 0.0141*** 0.0186*** 0.0118*** 
 (14.752) (12.228) (16.148) (10.321) 
100 ≤ CLTV (d) 0.0316*** 0.0294*** 0.0185*** 0.0062*** 
 (20.557) (19.149) (12.076) (4.019) 
CLTV unknown (d) -0.0238*** -0.0075*** -0.0276*** -0.0378*** 
 (-18.005) (-5.092) (-18.174) (-24.723) 
ARM (d)  0.0467*** 0.0533*** 0.0408*** 
  (47.067) (52.407) (37.717) 
Low doc (d)  0.0153*** 0.0192*** 0.0062*** 
  (14.622) (18.475) (5.862) 
Doc unknown (d)  -0.0370*** 0.0001 0.0051*** 
  (-25.185) (0.075) (3.329) 
Balloon (d)   0.0145*** 0.0073*** 
   (8.802) (4.418) 
Balloon unknown (d)   0.0304*** 0.0356*** 
   (19.535) (23.007) 
IO (d)   -0.0064*** -0.0076*** 
   (-5.706) (-6.720) 
IO unknown (d)   -0.1414*** -0.1395*** 
   (-87.702) (-86.913) 
Originated before 2004 (d)    -0.1359*** 
    (-75.295) 
Originated in 2004 (d)    -0.1530*** 
    (-79.098) 
Originated in 2005 (d)    -0.0912*** 
    (-75.687) 
Constant 0.1713*** 0.1275*** 0.1152*** 0.1549*** 
  (175.574) (95.969) (55.670) (72.192) 
Adj. R-sq 0.002 0.007 0.022 0.032 




I present four different specifications which vary with the number of controls ranging from only 
two controls (FICO credit scores and CLTV ratio) in model 1 to seven controls including various 
loan types associated with interest rate, level of documentation, balloon loan features, and interest-
only (IO) features. 
I use dummy variables for continuous numeric attributes like FICO and CLTV to flexibly address 
potential non-linearity. Notably, the base case is always set as the least risky category. Hence, the 
base cases are mortgages with FICO higher than 680, LTV at origination less than 80, fixed rate, full 
documentation, no balloon, and no IO. I present t-statistics in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates. I use White-Huber sandwich estimator for standard errors to address potential 
heteroskedasticity. 
Under the one-shot model with no consideration of the potential for selective disclosure of loan 
provider identity by sponsors, ex-ante risk generally seems to increase the likelihood of affiliation 
between the loan provider and the sponsor. For example, loan providers channel mortgages with 
FICO scores less than 620 to their affiliated securitizations more often (0.7% - 1.5%) than they do 
those with FICO scores higher than 680. Likewise, the affiliation is similarly more likely for the 
mortgages with high CLTV, adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), low-doc and balloon mortgages. This 
positive correlation between ex-ante risk characteristics and affiliation, nevertheless, is based on how 
sponsors report their affiliations with loan providers, which may not provide an accurate picture on 
how loan providers make choices between affiliated and unaffiliated securitizations. 
Although this model for reported disclosure does not lead to unbiased estimation for the relation 
between ex-ante risk factors and the affiliation choices made by loan providers, it provides some 
insight into the potential source of selection bias. Table 2.7 shows that sponsors report themselves 
as originators more often for the mortgages with ex-ante riskier underwriting characteristics. One 
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potential reason for this selective disclosure is that the sponsor can more easily issue and sell bonds 
backed by suspicious-looking mortgages when they carry the brand names of sponsors of large 
banks. This reasoning is consistent with the complaint lodged against E*Trade that they allegedly 
reported many of its loans to be originated in-house rather than truthfully disclosing unaffiliated and 
notorious loan providers. As sponsors continue to exploit their reputational capital, loan 
characteristics become more and more risky for the mortgages whose sponsors and originators are 
reported to be affiliated. Thus, the correlation between affiliation and risk characteristics could be 
seemingly and spuriously positive in the selected sample of mortgages whose originators are 
reported. 
2.5.1.2. Estimation of affiliation determination based on sample reconstruction 
In the analysis of how loan providers choose to sell among different securitizations, there are two 
distinct sources for bias. First, given the absence of regulation for loan-level disclosure of originator 
identity, sponsors provide information on originator name to BBx with the names of virtually any 
institutions in the origination process, leading to serious measurement errors. Second, since it is 
possible to calculate affiliations only for the mortgages whose loan provider is disclosed, the analysis 
may be vulnerable to selection bias if sponsors do not randomly disclose the identity of loan 
providers. To address these problems, I reconstruct my sample by backfilling and correcting the 
identity of loan providers based on the algorithm that was presented in section 2.4. The measure of 
affiliation based on the algorithm in section 2.4 is called “actual affiliation.” 
Table 2.9 shows the impact of ex-ante risk characteristics upon actual affiliation in OLS regression 
setting. The sample contains 2.1 million first lien mortgages whose loan provider is identifiable 
though the algorithm. The dependent variable is defined to be one if the loan provider I identified is 
affiliated with the sponsor and zero otherwise. I use an identical set of controls employed in the 
naïve approach in section 2.6.1.  
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Table 2.9. One-shot OLS for actual affiliation 
DV=1 if the loan provider is actually affiliated with the sponsor; 0 otherwise 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FICO < 620 (d) -0.0804*** -0.0527*** -0.0353*** -0.0357*** 
 (-104.319) (-65.271) (-43.017) (-44.795) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) -0.0456*** -0.0302*** -0.0211*** -0.0264*** 
 (-57.157) (-37.803) (-27.013) (-34.509) 
FICO unknown (d) 0.3221*** 0.3223*** 0.3061*** 0.3514*** 
 (207.442) (213.330) (210.986) (248.425) 
80 ≤ CLTV < 100 (d) -0.0677*** -0.0537*** -0.0443*** -0.0490*** 
 (-75.412) (-60.742) (-52.063) (-59.548) 
100 ≤ CLTV (d) -0.0261*** -0.0128*** -0.0154*** -0.0242*** 
 (-22.940) (-11.436) (-14.155) (-22.988) 
CLTV unknown (d) -0.2953*** -0.2375*** -0.2589*** -0.2311*** 
 (-353.874) (-275.079) (-295.997) (-265.367) 
ARM (d)  -0.1310*** -0.1127*** -0.1151*** 
  (-188.722) (-161.859) (-167.163) 
Low doc (d)  0.0090*** 0.0051*** -0.0080*** 
  (12.132) (6.977) (-11.335) 
Doc unknown (d)  -0.1584*** -0.1305*** -0.1283*** 
  (-191.258) (-148.022) (-148.468) 
Balloon (d)   -0.2546*** -0.2572*** 
   (-279.260) (-283.650) 
Balloon unknown (d)   -0.1099*** -0.0748*** 
   (-142.308) (-98.852) 
IO (d)   -0.0467*** -0.0435*** 
   (-63.021) (-59.764) 
IO unknown (d)   -0.2683*** -0.2301*** 
   (-270.692) (-230.837) 
Originated before 2004 (d)    -0.2974*** 
    (-168.937) 
Originated in 2004 (d)    -0.3178*** 
    (-126.358) 
Originated in 2005 (d)    -0.2077*** 
    (-308.713) 
Constant 0.4934*** 0.5706*** 0.6989*** 0.7340*** 
  (619.523) (552.434) (557.639) (599.963) 
Adj. R-sq 0.094 0.124 0.164 0.204 




All coefficients are negative and significant, suggesting that loan providers partition their mortgages 
into two groups depending on the ex-ante risk. Also, ex-ante less risky mortgages were transferred to 
loan providers’ own securitizations while ex-ante riskier mortgages are sold to unaffiliated sponsors. 
The riskier ranges of FICO and CLTV reduce the likelihood of sponsor-loan provider affiliation 
respectively by up to 8% and 6.7%. ARMs are deposited into affiliated trusts less often by 13.1% 
than FRMs. Exotic payments structures such as balloon and IO decreases affiliation by 26% and 
4.7%. Additionally, the estimates of vintage fixed effects in model 4 show that loan providers make 
affiliation choices more often for recently closed mortgages. Notably, lending standards have 
monotonically deteriorated in the years leading up to the crisis (Demyanyk and Van Hermert, 2011). 
The effects of some ex-ante risk characteristics attenuate when other attributes are added into the 
model. However, they are still economically and statistically significant even in model 4. 
Interestingly, the adjusted R-squared is substantially larger when I use actual affiliation than when I 
use reported affiliation. For example, the adjusted R-squared for full model increases from 0.032 in 
Table 2.8 to 0.204 in Table 2.9. 
2.5.1.3 Estimation of affiliation determination based on control function approach 
Calculation of the affiliation between loan provider and sponsor depends crucially on whether the 
identity of loan provider is available or not. This means there could be another layer of choice 
associated with sponsors’ disclosure of loan provider as well as the choice of affiliation made by loan 
providers. Therefore, I divide the problem into two parts: 
1)  𝐷∗ = 𝐵𝑋 + Γ𝑍 + 𝜀 
2) 𝐴 = Π𝑋 + 𝜇 
Equation 1 is the selection equation which models mortgages’ selection into the group whose loan 
providers are disclosed by sponsors. The dependent variable 𝐷∗ in equation 1 is sponsor’s utility-
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maximizing propensity of disclosing loan providers, or latent index of disclosure whose observable 
counterpart 𝐷 = 1 if   𝐷∗ > 0 and 𝐷 = 0 otherwise. 𝑋 is a vector of ex-ante default risk factors 
including the dummies for FICO, LTV, ARM, lien, and documentation. 𝑍 is a vector of variables 
excluded from equation 2. 𝑍 contains the number of loans in the deal, the indicator of whether the 
sponsor acquires mortgages from a single loan provider, and the quarterly deal vintages. These three 
variables are expected to affect the disclosure but do not otherwise directly affect the affiliation. The 
cost of tracking loan providers will be lower for the pools with a smaller number of mortgages. If 
the sponsor acquires a group of loans from a single provider, then there will be no need for 
additional disclosure at the loan level since the identity of the single loan provider should be 
available from the prospectus supplements or from the trust name. Disclosure choices are expected 
to vary with deal securitization dates as shown in Figure 6 where the disclosure rate has increased 
during the years leading up to the crisis.   
Equation 2 is the equation of interest which illustrates how loan providers make affiliation choices. 
The dependent variable 𝐴 equals one if the identity of a loan provider reported in 
ORIGINATORNAME is affiliated with the sponsor, and zero otherwise. Importantly, 𝐴 is 
“incidentally truncated” (Greene, 1990) in that it is observed only when the sponsor decides to 
disclose the loan provider. Sponsors may exploit their own reputational capital by reporting 
themselves as the originators for observably riskier mortgages as shown in section 2.5.1, which leads 
to affiliated mortgages having ex-ante riskier characteristics. In other words, equation 2 cannot be 
identified on its own because the non-zero correlation between 𝜇 and 𝜀. 
The system of equations 1 and 2 are often called Type II Tobit model (Amemiya, 1985). Wooldridge 
(2010) discuss the estimation of this model based on the following assumptions:  
a) (𝑋, 𝑍, 𝐷) are always observed, while 𝐴 is observed only when 𝐷 = 1, 
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b) (𝜀, 𝜇) is independent of (𝑋, 𝑍) with zero mean, 
c) 𝜀 ∼ 𝑁(0,1), and 
d) 𝜇 is a linear projection of 𝜀 
Following the two-step procedure developed by Heckman (1979) and Lee (1982), I use a function 
that controls for selection bias, which is also called “Inverse Mills ratio” or “control function”. This 
control function represents the component of  𝜇 associated with selective disclosure in equation 1 
which arguably causes the omitted variable problem in equation 2, and thus is the source of selection 
bias (Heckman, 1979). I estimate the control function based on equation 1 using all the mortgages 
securitized in 2006, which is embedded into equation 2.51 
Table 2.10 presents the marginal effects estimates for equations 1 and 2. I use Heckprob procedure 
in Stata because the dependent variable in the outcome equation is binary. The correlation between 
two residual terms from selection and outcome equations is estimated to be 0.297 with standard 
errors of 0.005. This statistical significance of correlation estimate means there does exist the sample 
selection problem. The positive value of correlation estimate implies the existence of some 
unobserved factor which moves disclosure and affiliation in the same direction. 
Column 1 corresponds to probit regression of sponsors’ disclosure choices upon ex-ante risk 
characteristics in equation 1. The selection equation results in Column 1 provides evidence that 
sponsors do disclose the identity of loan providers more often for ex-ante riskier mortgages, 
consistent with the notion that sponsors are pushed to provide information about loan provider 
identity for mortgages with worse underwriting characteristics.  
                                                          
51 This procedure is often called “Heckit” after Heckman (1976). 
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Table 2.10. Two-stage control function estimation 
  (1) Disclosure (2) Affiliation 
FICO < 620 (d) 0.0185*** -0.0005 
 (12.662) (-0.301) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) 0.0064*** -0.0059*** 
 (5.125) (-4.067) 
FICO unknown (d) -0.1848*** -0.0708*** 
 (-155.157) (-30.048) 
80 ≤ LTV < 100 (d) 0.0276*** -0.0037** 
 (22.818) (-2.575) 
100 ≤ LTV (d) 0.0750*** -0.0191*** 
 (31.787) (-8.444) 
LTV unknown (d) 0.0982*** 0.0019 
 (21.661) (0.438) 
ARM (d) 0.0601*** 0.0080*** 
 (49.879) (5.207) 
2nd lien (d) 0.0790*** -0.0001 
 (41.491) (-0.052) 
Lien unknown (d) -0.2098*** -0.0728*** 
 (-242.518) (-27.331) 
Low doc (d) -0.0100*** -0.0048*** 
 (-7.734) (-3.044) 
Doc unknown (d) 0.0263*** -0.0143*** 
 (16.064) (-8.088) 
Number of loans in the pool -0.0000***  
 (-39.448)  
Provided by a single LP (d) -0.0830***  
 (-74.790)  
Securitized in 2006 Q1 (d) -0.1956***  
 (-197.737)  
Securitized in 2006 Q2 (d) -0.2014***  
 (-197.516)  
Securitized in 2006 Q3 (d) -0.0450***  
  (-38.902)   




According to the results in section 6.1., sponsors may take advantage of the brand value of their 
originating arms to securitize those suspicious-looking loans. Disclosure is more likely for the 
mortgages with FICO less than 620 by 1.85% compared to those with FICO higher than 680. 
Increase in LTV ratio from the lowest group under 80 to the highest group above 100 is associated 
with more frequent disclosure by 7.5%. Disclosure rate is also higher for mortgages with adjustable 
rate and second lien than for their less risky counterpart by 6 to 8%. The relation between the 
number of loans in the pool and the disclosure incidence is not economically significant, however 
the disclosure rate is lower for the single loan-provider deals than for the others by 8.3%. The timing 
of securitization and disclosure also significantly affects sponsors’ disclosure choices. Disclosure 
frequency decreases by 4% to 20% when the pool of mortgages were securitized in the quarters 
earlier than the 4Q 2006. 
Column 2 in Table 2.10 shows the marginal effects estimates of ex-ante risk characteristics upon 
affiliation choices made by the loan providers. Affiliation is more likely for the mortgages with ex-
ante riskier characteristics, which contrasts with the results from the naïve approach without 
consideration of selection bias in section 2.5.1.1, and consistent with the results based on sample 
reconstruction in section 2.5.1.2. The likelihood of reported affiliation is the lowest for the 
intermediate level of FICO scores, and the change in LTV from the least risky to the most risky 
range reduces the reported affiliation by 1.9%. 
2.5.2. Affiliation and ex-post default risk 
I now examine how the post-securitization loan performance is associated with whether or not the 
loan provider is affiliated with the sponsor. This empirical relation is important to examine whether 
loan providers channel ex-post less risky mortgages for their own securitizations. 
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2.5.2.1. Estimation of affiliation effects on loan performance without consideration of 
selective disclosure 
Researchers may naively use ORIGINATORNAME variable in BBx to identify loan providers and 
their affiliation with the sponsors. Alternatively, I calculate affiliation using the algorithm presented 
in section 2.4. To investigate the possibility of bias arising from naively using loan-level disclosure of 
loan providers, or ORIGINATORNAME in BBx, I illustrate how the correlation between the post-
securitization loan performance and the sponsor-loan provider affiliation varies depending on 
different methods of identifying affiliations. Figure 2.9 shows what happens if the naïve measure of 
affiliation is used. 
 
Figure 2.9. Cumulative serious delinquency rate over the life of mortgage by disclosed affiliation 
 
I define a mortgage’s originator and sponsor as being “disclosed to be affiliated” if the originator 
identity is not missing in the loan-level BBx and the originator is reported to be the sponsor’s 
subsidiary, parent, or the sponsor itself. A mortgage is considered to be seriously delinquent if it falls 
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their originators are reported to be affiliated with the sponsor. Given the naïve metric of affiliation, 
mortgages perform the best when their originator identity information is missing in the trustee data. 
If I rely on the reported affiliation, the loan-provider and sponsor affiliation seems to increase the 
likelihood of mortgage distress.  
 
Figure 2.10. Cumulative serious delinquency rate over the life of mortgage for TBW securitizations 
 
For a robustness check, I use the sample of mortgages securitized by TBW in 2006 that shows the 
most dramatic differences in reporting ORIGINATORNAME in BBx across different deals. I 
include mortgages in TBW 2006-4 and 6 for which TBW reported itself as the originator in BBx, 
and those in TBW 2006-5 for which TBW reported one of 1,104 brokers and correspondents as the 
originator. Hence, the loan provider and the sponsor are measured to be affiliated for TBW 2006-4 
and 6 while it appears to be zero affiliation for the mortgages in TBW 2006-5. Figure 2.10 confirms 
the positive correlation between affiliation and the likelihood of defaults by showing that the 
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when originators and sponsors are reported to be affiliated than when they are reported to have no 
affiliation. 
2.5.2.2. Estimation of affiliation effects on loan performance based on sample reconstruction 
The positive correlation between affiliation and mortgage failure, however, is not consistent with the 
findings of Demiroglu and James (2012) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2010) that affiliation decreases 
defaults. Thus, I conduct the same examination using actual affiliation based on the true identity of 
loan providers derived from the algorithm in section 2.4. Figure 2.11 presents the expected pattern 
seen in previous studies where the mortgages whose loan providers and sponsors are affiliated 
perform better than unaffiliated loans.  
 
Figure 2.11. Cumulative serious delinquency rate over the life of mortgage by actual affiliation 
 
The estimated relation between post-securitization mortgage performance and sponsor-loan 
provider affiliation varies depending on the measure of affiliation. This suggests that if I rely only on 
the loan provider identity available from loan-level trustee data for the construction of affiliation 
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reported affiliation and the likelihood of defaults. First, MBS investors may demand more 
information regarding originator identity for riskier loans, leading to better performance of 
undisclosed loans than disclosed loans. Second, sponsors may exploit their reputational capital to 
form and sell MBS backed by the riskiest loans. According to a related lawsuit brought against 
E*Trade, the company allegedly concealed from investors that it “purchased loans from troubled 
subprime lenders such as National City, GMAC, Countrywide, Opteum, Inc. and Fremont General 
– who had become notorious for poor underwriting standards, illegal practices, government 
investigations, delinquencies, and the mortgage crisis.” 
2.5.2.3. Estimation of loan providers’ sponsoring ability on loan performance 
Underperformance of unaffiliated mortgages can be interpreted in two ways. First, loan providers as 
the originators may screen loan applicants more diligently for the mortgages they use to feed their 
own securitizations. Second, loan providers may cherry-pick less risky mortgages for their own 
securitization. According to Demiroglu and James (D & J, 2012), these two competing hypotheses 
are testable by examining the relation between loan providers’ sponsoring ability and loan 
performance. Loan providers with no capacity of securitization are not incentivized to cherry-pick 
good mortgages because they do not have their own shelves to feed. Hence, those loan providers 
always randomly pass through mortgages to unaffiliated sponsors. If the mortgages from loan 
providers with their own shelves are as safe as the mortgages from loan providers with no shelves, it 
is possible to argue that the former do not sell “lemons” to unaffiliated sponsors. 
D & J argue lax screening for unaffiliated mortgages because they find loan performance is not 
affected by loan providers’ ability to securitize. However, they dropped all mortgages whose risk 
factors are missing from their sample. The inclusion of those dropped mortgages makes a 
substantial difference in the estimated effects of loan providers’ sponsoring ability. 
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Table 2.11. The effects of sponsoring ability on loan performance 
 (1) Demiroglu and James (2) This paper 
Loan provider affiliated with sponsor (d) 0.780*** 0.864*** 
 (-13.08) (-3.14) 
Loan provider cannot sponsor (d) 0.977 2.083*** 
 (-0.75) (9.85) 
Missing indicators included N Y 
Risk factors controlled Y Y 
House price index controlled Y Y 
Loan vintage controlled Y Y 
N 373,871 206,67952 
 
Table 2.11 presents the estimates of odds ratio from the logit regression of loan performance. The 
effects of affiliation and sponsoring ability estimated by D & J are presented in column (1). In 
column (2), I replicate D & J’s model with the sample of mortgages in BBx. Missing indicators for a 
variety of risk factors and loan attributes are included in model (2) while D & J dropped all the 
mortgages with missing attributes in model (1). The effects of affiliation are qualitatively similar 
between (1) and (2). However, as shown in (2), mortgages from the loan providers with no shelves 
such as brokers default significantly more often than those from the loan providers who can 
securitize.53 Significantly positive effects of sponsoring ability on mortgage performance suggests 
that loan providers may not randomly pass through mortgages to unaffiliated sponsors.  
                                                          
52 Although I retain all the mortgages whose variables are missing, the size of my sample for model (2) is still 
smaller than D & J’s. This is because my sample consists only of 7 series (BOAA, BALTA, CWALT, 
DBALT, JPALT, NCAMT, and WMALT) presented as examples in D & J's table 1. This positive association 
between loan provider’s sponsoring ability and the likelihood of default is robust for the entire sample of 
mortgages securitized in 2006. 
53 This is not surprising given Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil’s (2010) results that brokered mortgages are 




This paper sheds light on the potential bias in the analysis of how loan providers divide their 
mortgages between their own securitizations and unaffiliated sponsors. Through detailed 
examination of current practices of disclosing loan providers in prospectus supplements and in a 
large loan-level dataset, I show that naïve use of reported loan provider identity could lead to 
substantial measurement errors and selection bias. Without proper consideration of these data and 
econometric issues, the loan providers spuriously seem to in-house securitize ex-ante risker 
mortgages selling less risky loans to unaffiliated securitizers. I suggest two methods to effectively 
address these issues. First, the loan provider identity in loan-level dataset can be recalculated based 
on several pieces of information available from prospectus supplements. After the missing or 
incorrect identities are recovered, it is possible to identify true affiliation between loan providers and 
sponsors. Second, the problem can be divided into two parts: 1) the selective disclosure of loan 
providers by the sponsors; and 2) the affiliation choices made by the loan providers. These two 




CHAPTER 3. WHY DO SPONSORS CARE ABOUT 
PERFORMANCE OF MORTGAGES THEY SECURITIZE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SPONSOR-SERVICER EFFECTS UPON 
MILD DELINQUENCIES 
3.1 Introduction 
In private mortgage securitizations, the sponsor is a non-agency financial institution that sells a pool 
of mortgages it originated or purchased to the issuer of securities backed by those underlying 
mortgages.54 The sponsor is a pivotal player in the securitization process in that its affiliations with 
other institutions have attracted attention from regulators and investors. Regulation AB (Reg AB), 
adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2004, requires disclosure of 
whether and how the sponsor is affiliated with its material transaction parties including servicers and 
originators of at least 10% of the mortgage pool.55  
Among others, Demiroglu and James (2012) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2010) show a significantly 
positive correlation between the sponsor-originator affiliation and the post-securitization 
performance of mortgages.56 The argument that the credit quality of mortgages varies with sponsor 
affiliations is based on the assumption that sponsors have “skin in the game,” or that sponsors’ 
profits are affected by the performance of securitized mortgages.  At first glance, this is puzzling 
because it is investors in MBS, not the originator nor the sponsor, who are the ultimate bearers of 
risk.  
There are two possible reasons why sponsors care about the quality of mortgages they already sold 
off in the form of MBS. The first explanation relates to the capital structure of trusts, or the entity 
                                                          
54 See the overview provided on p. 1508 of 33-8518FR. 
55 See “Affiliations and Certain Relationships and Related Transactions,” p.1550 of 33-8518FR. 
56 Demiroglu and James (2012) argue the affiliation between the sponsor and the originator encourages more 
stringent screening of loan applicants. Titman and Tsyplakov (2010) argue that originators cherry-pick less 
risky mortgages for their own securitizations. 
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that issues MBS. DeMarzo (2005) developed a theoretical model that showed “tranching” of an asset 
pool into senior, mezzanine, and residual tranches may lead to optimal securitization. Dermiroglu 
and James (2012) document that sponsors are exposed to default risk even after MBS issuance and 
sale because they often hold the bonds backed by the residual tranche. Indeed, the initial owner of 
the residual certificates, or securities backed by residual tranches, is stated to be the sponsor in 
prospectus supplements for some deals such as SAMI, SACO, and BALTA sponsored by Bear 
Stearns, ACE, and DBALT sponsored by Deutsche bank, to name a few. However, residual 
certificates are also sold to third-party investors as documented in Figure 3.1 for the prospectus 
supplement of ARSI 2006-M1 sponsored by Ameriquest. 
 
Figure 3.1. Excerpt from “The Certificates” in the prospectus supplement for ARSI 2006-M1 
 
The second source of “skin in the game” for the sponsors is their reputation.57 Given the 
information asymmetry that exists between sponsors and MBS investors about the credit quality of 
collateralized mortgages (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008), it is necessary for sponsors to maintain 
their reputations in order to sell bonds at a fair market price in the long term.58 Poor performance of 
                                                          
57 Titman and Tsyplakov (2010) argue that distressed originators do not carefully underwrite mortgages to 
earn short-term revenue in exchange for their reputation. 
58 This is consistent with the theories developed by Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Allen (1984) 
that sellers whose product quality is unknown to buyers seek for long-term benefits from favorable reputation 
rather than exploiting their reputation to sell low-quality goods at higher price. 
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mortgages may erode subordinate tranches damaging sponsors’ reputations and future profits. Thus, 
it is natural for sponsors to be concerned about performance of mortgages even after securitizations.  
There are multiple strategies for sponsors to isolate MBS investors from loss and maintain their 
reputations. For example, sponsors may provide implicit recourse to investors (Calomiris and 
Mason, 2004)59. If the sponsor is also servicing the mortgages it securitized, then it may provide 
better quality of servicing as shown in this paper. 
I empirically address the question of why sponsors care about the performance of mortgages they 
have already sold in the form of MBS. To my best knowledge, this is the first paper that explores the 
sources of sponsors’ “skin in the game.” Using a large, unique dataset constructed with BBx, 
ABSnet, prospectus supplements for securitized RMBS deals, and electronic government archives, I 
show that a substantial portion of mortgages move back and forth between being current and 60 
days in arrears, without ever reaching foreclosure and liquidation. In this paper, mortgages are 
defined to be in mild delinquency (MDQ) if a mortgage repeatedly has the status of 30 to 60 days in 
arrears, but never reaches a more serious state of delinquency. MDQ is arguably a better measure for 
servicing quality than other performance measures such as serious delinquency, default, or 
foreclosure which could be determined by a variety of factors other than servicing quality.60 I show 
that mortgages experience MDQ less often when a sponsor “takes care” of mortgages as the 
primary servicer than when mortgages are serviced by institutions unaffiliated with the sponsor. 
More importantly, this affiliation effect upon MDQ becomes stronger after the most junior tranche 
has dried up. These results imply that sponsors provide better servicing than external servicers do, 
                                                          
59 According to Calomiris and Mason (2004), in the context of credit card securitization, regulatory capital 
arbitrage through implicit recourse may be socially beneficial for the purposes of reputation, signaling, and 
efficient risk allocation. 
60 I discuss MDQ in detail in section 3.2. 
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particularly after their subordinate tranches and reputation begin to suffer damage, which strongly 
supports the reputation approach to sponsors’ “skin in the game.”  
I structure the rest of the paper as follows. The following section discusses MDQ in greater detail. 
Section 3.3 explains how my dataset is compiled from sources including BBx, ABSnet, and 
electronic government archives. Section 3.4 presents the estimates for the relation between sponsor-
servicer affiliation and MDQ, and the evolution of these affiliation effects around the date when the 
residual tranche has dried up based on hazard and linear approaches. Finally, section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Mild delinquencies as the measure for servicing quality 
Default management is the most important task of servicers. MBS investors can directly benefit 
from proper servicing regardless of how severe the delinquency has become (Mason, 2009). The 
degree to which servicing quality affects returns to investors, however, could vary with different 
mortgage failure types. Serious delinquency is expected to have lower correlation with servicing 
quality than MDQ because it is driven more by variation in the mortgagor’s ability to repay than the 
servicer’s due diligence. Moody’s (2003) documents the importance of “distinction between the 
quality of the mortgage loans and the quality of servicer.”61  
Alternatively, foreclosure and modification are noisier measures of servicing quality because they are 
influenced by many factors including regional variation in foreclosure procedures and regulations62; 
credit quality of the mortgages; servicer or lender’s willingness and ability to renegotiate; government 
subsidies for modification, etc. Moreover, I cannot always interpret fewer foreclosure and more 
modifications to be directly connected with high quality servicing because loss mitigation is often 
                                                          
61 See Residential Mortgage Servicer Quality (“SQ”) Ratings in EMEA: Moody’s Methodology (2003). 
62 See Ghent and Kudlyak (2011). See http://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-guides/foreclosure-laws/ for 
the variation in foreclosure laws and procedures. 
81 
 
possible with prompt foreclosures, and modification can also be used as a means of predatory 
servicing (Mason, 2007).  
If a mortgagor is one or two months behind the payment schedule, three interpretations are 
possible: 1) mistakes on the part of borrower; 2) a prelude to default; and 3) the result of poor or 
predatory servicing. To correctly identify MDQ as a result of poor or predatory servicing, I exclude 
one-time 30 days in delinquency (borrower’s innocent mistakes) and 30 to 60 days delinquencies 
followed by 90+ days in arrears (a prelude to default).  
I argue one cause of MDQ is poor servicing. It is notable that mortgagors often repeatedly fall into 
MDQ within a relatively short time frame. They also stay in MDQ for an extended period of time 
without rolling into serious delinquency. This means payments are continuously made, but the 
borrower remains just one or two months behind. If servicers adequately manage MDQ, then 
mortgagors should be able to quickly catch up with their payment schedule. As documented in 
Moody’s (2003), however, “in order to manage arrears effectively, a servicer must establish contact 
with the borrower and determine the cause of the arrears,” which is costly to do. Servicers are 
compensated with a fixed fee as a percentage of outstanding mortgage pool, hence the amount of 
their servicing effort is not expected to vary with the occurrence of MDQ if all other conditions are 
held constant. However, if the servicer is also the sponsor who has a vested interest in mortgage 
performance, then the servicer has the incentive to expend its resources for telephone calls, mailings, 
and incurrence of legal and administrative costs to attempts to cure the MDQ. 
Another reason for MDQ could be predatory servicing. MDQ may be an opportunity for servicers 
to earn late fee (as high as 5% of monthly payments) 63 in addition to servicing income which 
                                                          
63 See Herkenhoff and Ohanian (2012). 
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typically accounts for 12.5 to 50 basis points of remaining principal balance64.  Servicers are required 
to make payments on behalf of delinquent borrowers out of their own pockets to MBS holders. 
Hence, if the servicers can cheaply fund the interest expenses accruing on the monthly payments 
they make for delinquent borrowers, then servicers may push healthy borrowers into delinquencies.  
There is a body of testimonial, anecdotal and indirect evidence for fraudulent and predatory 
servicing practices. Thompson testified “For many subprime servicers, late fees alone constitute a 
significant fraction of their total income and profit…Servicers thus have an incentive to push 
homeowners into late payments and keep them there” in front of the U.S. Senate Committee.65  
Servicers may take advantage of mortgagors’ inability to prove the exact date of payment, charging 
late fees even when mortgagors are not behind the payment schedules (U.S. General Accounting 
Office [GAO] 1989). For example, FTB Mortgage Services misapplied the payments from 
borrowers, collecting unwarranted late fees and ignoring contact from borrowers’ attorneys.66 Some 
servicers claimed that borrowers missed payments even before the end of the allowed grace period 
(Brennan 1998). Several servicers sent inaccurate monthly payment demands to charge late fees 
(Isaac 2001). Additional fees for default management are another plausible motivation for servicers 
to cause MDQ. According to Renuart (2003), MDQ is a good excuse for servicers to charge fees for 
property inspections and appraisals regardless of whether or not those services are actually 
necessary. Servicers can usually keep all the fees generated from MDQ. Revenue from extra fees is 
typically large enough to cover the operating costs of servicers (Cornwell 2004).67 The potential 
                                                          
64 See Mason (2007). 
65  Diane E. Thompson, a counsel of National Consumer Law Center, testified before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on “Preserving Homeownership: Progress Needed to 
Prevent Foreclosures” on July 19, 2009. Her other testimonial on “Problems in Mortgage Servicing From 
Modification to Foreclosure” on November 16, 2010 also illustrates how servicers can profit from late fees. 
66 Ronemus vs. FTB Mortgage Services, 201 B.R. 458 (1996) 
67 For example, Ocwen Financial Corporation earned $46 million as late fees, accounting for about 18% of 
Ocwen’s servicing income in 2008. Countrywide charged and earned $285 million as late fees in 2006. Although 
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effects of predatory servicing may be non-negligible because mortgage terms are typically so 
complicated that borrowers may not be able to figure out whether fees are legitimately charged 
(Medine 2000).  
I hypothesize that servicing quality increases when the sponsor itself handles mortgages as the 
primary servicer. For the purpose of empirical tests, mortgage performance can be a measure which 
represents the quality of servicing.68 I classify mortgage performance into three categories. First, 
serious delinquency refers to 90 or more days in arrears followed by foreclosure. Second, foreclosure 
and modification are the actions taken by servicers for distressed mortgages. Third measure is 
MDQ, or 30 to 60 days in arrears which is the relevant measure for this paper.  
3.3 Data 
This paper employs a unique dataset constructed with three different sources. BBx provides 
information on individual mortgages. Deal-level information is available from ABSnet. I also 
obtained macro-economic variables from electronic archives of government agencies. 
3.3.1 BBx 
The main data source is BBx compiled by Blackbox Logic, LLC.69 BBx provides detailed 
information on mortgages securitized by private institutions other than government sponsored 
entities (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. BBx consists of three files: two loan-level 
datasets including loan tapes (CHARs) and remittance data (PERIODICs), and one deal-level data 
                                                          
a single inspection brings only $15, large servicers such as Wells Fargo with 7.7 million mortgages can earn up 
to $115 million through inspections (Thompson 2010).  
68 A servicer can handle mortgages it securitized as the sponsor. The same institution may also handle 
mortgages for unaffiliated sponsors as the external servicer. The quality of servicing is expected to be 
different between these internally and externally serviced mortgages. Hence, the “Servicer quality ratings” 
issued by Moody’s cannot be used in my analysis because it cannot capture the variation in servicing quality 
within the institution. See “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions” at 
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsand%
20Definitions.pdf  
69 See Mason, Imerman, and Lee (2014), and Mason and Lee (2014) for detailed information about BBx data. 
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(DEALs). I use CHARs to retrieve the names of primary servicers to construct my key indicator 
variable of whether a mortgage’s servicer is affiliated with the sponsor who securitizes it.  
I hypothesize that the servicing quality increases when the sponsor and the servicer are affiliated, 
which reduces MDQ. However, MDQ is also associated with negative credit events on the part of 
mortgagors. Hence, it is important to estimate the effects of servicer-sponsor affiliation controlling 
for various factors that capture the credit quality of mortgages. CHARS also provides underwriting 
characteristics such as a mortgagor’s FICO score, loan-to-value ratio, interest rate type, lien type, 
credit category, and origination date.  
The first risk measure is the Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) credit score designed to rank individuals 
based on their financial history. FICO in BBx ranges from 350 to 800 in proportion to the 
probability of timely repayment. Loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the ratio of original loan amount and 
the appraisal value of the property. LTV is an important risk factor which represents how much 
equity borrowers hold against the mortgage debt amount, and thus how likely lenders are to absorb 
losses in the event of foreclosure. There may exist more than one loan or lien against the same 
property. Second lien mortgages are riskier because the second lien lenders will only get paid after 
the first mortgages are satisfied in event of foreclosure.  
Interest rate type is also informative in estimating default risk. Borrowers with adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs) are exposed to higher risk in that they need to make significantly more monthly 
payments over the life of mortgages than the fixed rate mortgages (FRMs). Exotic features such as 
interest only (IO) and negative amortization are more conspicuous among ARMs.70 Issuers of MBS 
                                                          
70 The portions of interest only and negative amortization mortgages are respectively 28.1% and 18.2% of 
ARMs while they account for only 11.6% and 2.7% among FRMs. 
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designate credit categories for the collateralized mortgages as prime, alt-a, and subprime, which are 
also added into the model to control for negative credit events which are not driven by servicers. 
To construct MDQ, I need to measure the evolution of mortgage performance over time. 
Specifically, I use a data field in PERIODICS called MBADELINQUENCYSTATUS, or the 
delinquency status defined by Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). MBADELINQUENCY 
STATUS is a set of codes which illustrates the location of the loan in its performance curve. 
Mortgagors are defined to be in MDQ if they stay in 30 to 60 days in arrears after they miss their 
payments for the first time, however if they never fall into worse status.71  
 
Figure 3.2. The portion of the MDQ across time 
 
I am interested in the situation where a mortgagor repeatedly fails to catch up with their payment 
schedules due to poor or predatory servicing, not because of negative credit events against 
                                                          
71 The values of MBADELINQUENCYSTATUS include “C”, “3”, “6”, and “9”, respectively indicating 
current payment, 30, 60, and 90+ days in arrears. In terms of BBx, a mortgage is defined to be in MDQ if its 
MBADELINQUENCYSTATUS changes between “3” and “6” back and forth after it had “3” for the first 
time, and never falling into “9” or worse. According to MBA’s convention, a borrower is 30-day delinquent if 













borrowers. Hence, first failure of payment and serious delinquency followed by foreclosure are not 
counted as MDQ.  
Figure 3.2 exhibits the portions of two mortgage groups in mild delinquency (MDQ) and serious 
delinquency (SDQ) across time from Jan 2004 to Dec 2010. A mortgage is serious delinquent if the 
borrower fell into 90 days in arrears or worse status. Both groups accounted for around 5% of the 
population with the MDQ cohort slightly larger than the SDQ one during the years leading up to 
the crisis. However, the portion of SDQ group dramatically increased up to 28% as the crisis 
deepened. 
3.3.2 ABSnet 
I use ABSnet for deal-level information which is not available in BBx. The key variable in the 
analysis is the affiliation between the primary servicer and the sponsor. I obtain the identity of 
sponsors from prospectus supplements (forms 424B2, 424B3, and 424B5) of MBS trusts which are 
downloadable in the section of legal reports in ABSnet.72 Notably, the sponsor may take over the 
servicing rights for some of the mortgages it acquires from multiple loan providers, or the sponsor 
sometimes retains its servicing rights for the mortgages it closed as the originator. Therefore, there 
may be both internal and external servicers concurrently within a deal. 
Another key variable in the analysis of how the affiliation effects varies depending on whether a 
sponsor retains financial stakes in its mortgage trust is the date when the most junior tranche dries 
up. ABSnet provides the time-varying capital structure from which I can observe the dynamics of 
outstanding balance for each tranche. I hand-collected the information of outstanding balance for 
                                                          
72 Alternatively, prospectus supplements are also available from SEC Edgar and Bloomberg terminal. 
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junior tranches (X to R) over time and calculated when the balances of subordinate tranche reached 
zero.  
3.3.3 Macro variables 
It is also important to control for changes in macroeconomic conditions in order to quantify the 
effects of sponsor-servicer affiliation upon the quality of servicing, as measured by the likelihood of 
MDQ. To control for time-varying influences of macroeconomic conditions upon mortgage 
performance, I use two variables, unemployment rates and housing price indices. The monthly 
unemployment rate at the county level comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The home 
price indices (HPI) are obtained from Federal Housing Finance Agency (formerly Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight HPI). This is quarterly price index at state level for single-family, 
conventional mortgage transactions which conform to the guide line set by government sponsored 
entities. I decide to choose FHFA-HPI instead of S&P Case-Shiller HPI because I am interested in 
looking at a broad geographic area, and do not wish to limit myself to single family houses in twenty 
metropolitan areas.  
3.4 Empirical models and results 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
This paper empirically examines how the affiliation between sponsor and servicer affects the 
likelihood of mild delinquencies. Additionally, I am interested in how the affiliation effects vary 
depending on the amount of financial stakes the sponsor retains in the mortgage trust. I begin the 
empirical analysis with the examination of statistical characteristics for my sample. 
Table 3.1 presents the number of observations for which variables are not missing and the means 
for the whole sample of mortgages securitized in 2006, the group of mortgages serviced by external 
servicers (institutions unaffiliated with the sponsor), and the mortgages internal servicers (the 
sponsor or its affiliate) take care of. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for mortgage characteristics by affiliations 
 All 
 
Serviced by  
external servicers  
Serviced by  
internal servicers 





% internal servicers 4632938 53.86% 
      























































% subprime 4612530 34.03%   2066675 42.31%   2422097 28.05% 
 
 Among the approximately 4.6 million mortgages sold into private securitizations in 2006, internal 
servicers account for over half (53.86%) of the sample. On average, observable underwriting 
characteristics suggest that mortgages handled by internal servicers are less risky. Internally serviced 
mortgages have higher FICO credit scores and lower loan-to-value ratios by 4.6% and 7.6% 
respectively. The initial interest rate is 14% higher for externally serviced mortgages than internally 
serviced ones. Average loan amount and the appraisal value of the property at loan origination are 
higher for internal mortgages by 15.3% and 26%.  External parties service ARMs and subprime 
mortgages 12% and 51% more than internal servicers.  
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Table 3.2. Top 10 servicers by affiliation 
Top 20 External Servicers Percent   Top 20 Internal Servicers Percent 
Wells Fargo 20.88  Countrywide Home Loans 26.44 
Ocwen 9.87  Residential Funding Corp 13.63 
Litton Loan Servicing 7.32  Aurora Loan Services 14.17 
Bank of America 5.66  EMC Mortgage 8.69 
American Home Mortgage 4.29  Washington Mutual 7.39 
Countrywide Home Loans 3.94  IndyMac 5.3 
Select Portfolio Servicing 3.85  Bank of America 4.87 
Wilshire Credit Corp 3.58  Wells Fargo 3.98 
Homeq Servicing Corp 3.19  JP Morgan Chase 3.16 
GMAC 2.93  Ameriquest Mortgage 2.59 
National City Bank 2.87  Option One 2.32 
Lasalle Bank 2.08  Carrington Mortgage Services 1.41 
Option One 1.93  Chase Manhattan Bank 1.25 
Chase Manhattan Bank 1.9  American Home Mortgage 1.15 
Saxon Mortgage Services 1.87  Long Beach Bank 0.76 
JP Morgan Chase 1.37  First Horizon 0.68 
Home Loan Services 1.06  Bayview Loan Servicing 0.51 
New Century 0.91  New Century 0.47 
Doral Financial Corp 0.9  Fremont 0.39 
PHH Mortgage 0.77   Equity One 0.38 
 
Table 3.2 presents the twenty largest external and internal primary servicers and their respective 
market shares. The sample is restricted to the mortgages securitized in 2006 for which sponsors are 
identified from prospectus supplements in ABSnet. Wells Fargo, Ocwen, Litton, Bank of America, 
and American Home Mortgage account for 48.02% of mortgages whose servicers and sponsors are 
not affiliated. Notably, unlike Ocwen and Litton whose businesses are primarily focused on 
servicing, other large external servicers are major originators and sponsors in the non-agency 
securitization industry. Countrywide, Residential Funding Corporation, Aurora, EMC and 
Washington Mutual handle 70.32% of internally serviced mortgages. 
3.4.2 The relation between affiliation and MDQ - Hazard analysis 
Defaults and prepayments typically occur only once over the life of a mortgage. However, MDQs 
are repeatable events because borrowers can fall behind and catch up with their payment schedules 
90 
 
many times over the life of the loan. I argue that the frequency and duration of MDQ are correlated 
with the quality of servicing in that mortgagors who frequently experience 30 to 60 days 
delinquencies may do so in past because of poor servicing quality. I posit that these delinquencies 
perhaps could have been avoided if primary servicers were affiliated with the sponsors and thus 
more diligent in servicing.  
In the context of mild delinquencies, hazard is defined as the risk that the borrower falls behind her 
payment schedule due to poor servicing in a particular remittance period. Figure 3.3 illustrates how 
MDQ hazards are constructed based on an example of mortgage remittance reports.  
 
Figure 3.3. Construction of MDQ hazards 
 
The numbers underneath the timeline indicate the number of months since the loan has been 
securitized. A spell is the total number of remittance reports observed prior to a borrower falling 30 
days in arrears.73 I contrast the length of spells 1 and 2 with spell 3 because 30-day delinquencies in 
the former are temporary and cured later while the 30-day delinquency in the latter is followed by 
more serious delinquencies and thus censored from the right. In the example from Figure 3.3, there 
                                                          
73 The length of spell corresponds to the duration in a typical hazard model. 
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are three spells, whose durations are respectively 3, 2, and 4 months. Empirical hazard is the number 
of spells which end during the interval divided by the effective sample size at the beginning of the 
interval. I estimate a hazard function using the following formula: 
 
       (1) 
 
I define one interval as three months, or one quarter, in this context. The midpoint for the i-th 
interval is denoted as 𝑡𝑖𝑚. The number of MDQ events is detnoed as 𝑑𝑖. The width of the interval is 
𝑏𝑖. The number still at risk at the beginning of the interval is 𝑛𝑖 . The number of cases withdrawn 
within the interval, or censored due to transfer out of BBx or serious delinquency is 𝑤𝑖.   
I begin empirical tests with estimation of the Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard to examine the 
univariate relationship between sponsor-servicer affiliation and the likelihood of MDQ. Figure 3.4 
presents the estimates of empirical hazard of MDQ for the mortgages securitized in 2006 during the 
time when they stay in the trust. In the context of MDQ, an empirical hazard refers to the ratio of 
the number of mortgages that experience MDQ to the number of mortgages that have not yet 
experienced MDQ. The horizontal axis denotes the number of months since the most recent MDQ. 
Intervals for hazard estimates are given in increments of three months. The vertical axis presents the 
probability of MDQ at time 𝑡 conditional that the mortgagors were current on their payment at time 
𝑡 − 1. The solid line corresponds to the mortgages serviced by external servicers, and the dotted line 




The two empirical hazards are significantly different from each other at 1% level. The hazard curves 
are generally downward sloping with earlier quarters containing higher hazards. This can be 
interpreted as once a mortgagor falls into MDQ, she repeatedly experiences subsequent MDQs 
within a relatively short time frame. Another noticeable pattern is that the hazards are higher in the 
second and the eighth quarters since securitization than surrounding periods, regardless of servicers’ 
affiliation type.  
MDQ is a function of both credit quality of mortgagors and poor or predatory servicing. 
Mortgagors may miss their monthly payments because they experience negative credit events, or a 
downturn in housing markets may lead some borrowers to strategically default; thus MDQ is related 
to factors beyond servicer quality. Therefore, it is important to control for MDQ factors which are 
not related to servicing frictions.  
 












0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48





I next examine whether the affiliation between the servicer and the sponsor decreases the hazard of 
30 to 60 days in arrears even after controlling for mortgage characteristics such as FICO credit 
scores, LTV ratios, interest rate type, lien type, credit category, property location, and mortgage 
vintages. I estimate Cox proportional hazard regressions of MDQs upon affiliation using the 
following specification: 
 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) =  𝜆0(𝑡)exp [𝛼× 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖  + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖]       (2) 
 
where 𝑡 is the length of a spell. ℎ𝑖(𝑡) is the function for the hazard of mild delinquency. The 
baseline hazard is denoted as 𝜆0(𝑡). The key independent variable 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 equals one if the 
servicer and the sponsor are affiliated for a particular mortgage. A vector of characteristics for 
mortgage 𝑖 is denoted as 𝑋𝑖.  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a vector of dummy variables for property location at the state 
level.74 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 is a vector of dummy variables which indicate when the mortgages were originated. 
Notably, equation 2 is constructed as one-stage model because in this setting I am not concerned 
with potential sample selection issues. The names for primary servicers and sponsors are available 
from BBx loan tapes and prospectus supplements for virtually every loan, which eases the concerns 
about selection bias.75  
                                                          
74 Due to computational burden, I use state dummies to control for regional differences in Cox proportional 
hazard model. 
75 In contrast, the studies associated with loan providers (or originators) are subject to selection bias because 
disclosure of loan providers is a choice of securitizers based on ex-ante risk characteristics. See Mason and 
Lee (2014) for details. 
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Table 3.3 presents the hazard ratio estimates for the effects of affiliation between the servicer and 
the sponsor on the hazard of MDQ based on a Cox-proportional hazard model as specified in 
equation (2). I use about 5 million observations in the longitudinal format. 
Table 3.3. Cox hazard regression with loan attributes 
Dependent variable: the hazard of mild delinquency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sponser = Servicer (d) 0.954*** 0.98*** 0.934*** 0.965*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Log of FICO at origination 0.045*** 0.086*** 0.043*** 0.088*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0088) (0.0048) (0.0087) 
Log of LTV at origination 0.996*** 1.068*** 0.995*** 1.082*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
ARM (d)  1.318***  1.296*** 
  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
2nd lien (d)  1.337***  1.367*** 
  (0.0018)  (0.0019) 
Alt-A (d)  1.148***  1.157*** 
  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Subprime (d)  1.179***  1.213*** 
  (0.0025)  (0.0025) 
Originated before 2000 (d)   0.948*** 0.998 
   (0.0107) (0.0111) 
Originated in 2000 (d)   0.9*** 0.973*** 
   (0.0151) (0.0153) 
Originated in 2001 (d)   0.906*** 0.945*** 
   (0.0132) (0.0136) 
Originated in 2002 (d)   0.908*** 0.985* 
   (0.0105) (0.0109) 
Originated in 2003 (d)   0.903*** 0.98*** 
   (0.0083) (0.0083) 
Originated in 2004 (d)   0.901*** 0.934*** 
   (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Originated in 2005 (d)   0.855*** 0.853*** 
      (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Property location FE N N Y Y 
Log-likelihood value -68183085 -67417634 -68017106 -67254046 
N 5,047,718 4,996,261 5,038,012 4,986,562 
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The sample period covers the remittance reports for the mortgages in the trusts securitized in 2006. 
The dependent variable is the hazard of MDQ. I present four specifications to show results, with 
and without consideration of mortgage characteristics beyond FICO and LTV, property locations 
and mortgage vintage fixed effects.  
I present the simplest specification as model 1 containing only variables for the affiliation between 
the servicer and the sponsor, and borrowers’ FICO and LTV. I add more controls for mortgage 
types related to interest rate, lien, and credit ratings in models 2 and 4. Loan vintage dummies are 
included in models 3 and 4. Depending on specification, the servicer-sponsor affiliation significantly 
decreases the hazard of MDQ by 2 to 6.6%.76 This is consistent with the first hypothesis that 
primary servicers provide superior servicing when they are also sponsors of the securitizations. This 
negative relation between servicer-sponsor affiliation and the hazard of MDQ is robust even when 
the sample is restricted to the group of mortgages serviced only by sponsors with servicing platform. 
MDQ is also significantly associated with ex-ante risk factors such as FICO, interest rate variability, 
credit category, and lien types. MDQ is more likely for the mortgages with low FICO scores, 
adjustable interest rates, second liens and non-prime category whose base servicing costs are 
expected to be higher than their less risky counterparts. 
 
3.4.3 The relation between affiliation and MDQ - Linear analysis 
The hazard scheme is flexible enough to capture repetitive nature of MDQ and the length of time 
up to the occurrence of events. However, hazard analysis has one drawback. Mortgagors may 
                                                          
76 The hazard ratio means the variation in the rate of MDQ when the independent variable of interest 
increases by one unit with all other variables held constant. Hence, from the hazard ratio of 0.965 for 
sponsor-servicer affiliation dummy in model 4, I say the rate of MDQ decreases by 3.5% (= 100% − 96.5%) 
as the servicer for a mortgage changes from external to internal one.  
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continuously stay in 30 to 60 days in arrears for an extended period without coming back to be 
current, and the subsequent MDQs within a spell is not considered in the construction of the 
previously presented hazard. For example, in Figure 3.3, the mortgagor falls into 30 days in arrears 
again in the fifth month and remains in that state for the next three months. Spell 2, however, does 
not include MDQs in the sixth and seventh months. In order to overcome this problem, I use the 
mild delinquency (MDQ) ratio77 as an alternative measure of the propensity for MDQs. The MDQ 
ratio is defined as the number of months for which borrowers face 30 to 60 days in arrears divided 
by the number of months for which mortgages do not fall into serious delinquencies. Using this 
measure, the value of MDQ ratio for the mortgage in Figure 3.3 is 4/11 or 0.364.  
 
Figure 3.5. The distribution of mild delinquency ratio (MDR) 
 
I present the histograms of MDQ ratio by affiliation types in Figure 3.5. Regardless of sponsor-
servicer affiliation, the majority of mortgages have a MDQ ratio less than 10%. Fewer and fewer 
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mortgages have higher MDQ ratios for both groups. The size of the cohort with MDQ ratio less 
than 10% is larger for mortgages whose sponsors and servicers are affiliated than for the others. In 
contrast, the size of cohorts with a MDQ ratio higher than 10% are always smaller for internally 
serviced mortgages than for externally serviced ones. This is consistent with my expectation that 
mortgages will experience longer periods of MDQ when they are externally serviced because 
servicers are relatively more negligent and predatory for the mortgages they did not securitize. 
I examine whether this negative relation between the MDQ ratio and servicer-sponsor affiliation holds 
when other ex-ante risk characteristics are controlled, using the following model: 
𝑀𝐷𝑄 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 =  𝛼× 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖  + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝐶𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖   (3) 
where the dependent variable is the MDQ ratio for mortgage 𝑖. The MDQ ratio is modeled as a linear 
function of the affiliation between the servicer and the sponsor ( 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖 ), ex-ante risk 
characteristics or loan attributes (𝑋𝑖), property location (𝐶𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑖)
78, and loan vintage (𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖).  
I present OLS regression estimates for the relation between MDQ ratio and sponsor-servicer 
affiliations in Table 3.4. Of the approximately 4 million mortgages securitized in 2006, I use 500,000 
random sample in this analysis. I present four specifications with varying levels of controls. Models 2 
and 4 have additional controls for loan types. Fixed effects associated with loan vintages and property 
locations are additionally controlled in models in 3 and 4. OLS estimates are consistent with the Cox 
regression results. 
The proportion of loan life spent in MDQ significantly decreases when the sponsor plays the role of 
the primary servicer. This negative correlation between MDQ ratio and sponsor-servicer affiliation is 
                                                          
78 Core based statistical area (CBSA) is the union of metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas. 
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robust across different models. The MDQ ratio increases when mortgages have higher ex-ante risk 
characteristics, including low FICO, high LTV, adjustable interest rate, and 2nd lien status. 
Table 3.4. OLS regression of MDQ ratio on loan attributes79  
Dependent variable = the ratio of MDQ 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sponsor = Servicer (d) -0.0136*** -0.0128*** -0.0123*** -0.0084*** 
 (-33.090) (-30.907) (-29.442) (-19.691) 
FICO < 620 (d) 0.0858*** 0.0854*** 0.0844*** 0.0066*** 
 (148.699) (145.513) (144.774) (4.434) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) 0.0304*** 0.0299*** 0.0301*** 0.0177*** 
 (57.951) (56.657) (57.275) (24.662) 
FICO unknown (d) 0.0437*** 0.0438*** 0.0432*** -0.0072*** 
 (76.419) (61.185) (75.040) (-6.118) 
LTV < 80 (d) -0.0164*** -0.0154*** -0.0156*** -0.0120*** 
 (-19.462) (-18.110) (-18.446) (-13.659) 
80 ≤ LTV < 100 (d) -0.0036*** -0.0032*** -0.0026*** -0.0020** 
 (-4.258) (-3.585) (-3.076) (-2.192) 
LTV unknown (d) 0.0414*** 0.0706*** 0.0554*** 0.0904*** 
 (27.372) (41.235) (34.585) (50.814) 
ARM (d)  0.0115***  0.0125*** 
  (24.726)  (26.202) 
2nd lien (d)  0.0100***  0.0079*** 
  (16.523)  (12.668) 
Lien unknown (d)  0.0051***  -0.0118*** 
  (6.802)  (-13.725) 
Vintage fixed effects N N Y Y 
Location fixed effects N N Y Y 
adj. R-sq 0.061 0.066 0.066 0.078 
N 476582 471164 476582 460605 
 
3.4.4 The variation in affiliation effects around the dry-up date 
In sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3., I showed that MDQ is more likely for mortgages whose sponsors 
outsource servicing from unaffiliated institutions. This implies that servicing quality is better when 
                                                          

















sponsors themselves service mortgages they deposit in their own trust. Hence, it is natural to posit 
that sponsors care about the performance of mortgages in their deals.  
In this section, I examine why sponsors are incentivized to take care of mortgages whose bonds are 
already sold off to investors. There are two possible reasons. First, sponsors may retain the residuals 
(Stanton, 2005; Demiroglu and James, 2012). Second, sponsors may care more about their reputation 
that is a function of the returns on the bonds they issued. Both arguments are consistent with the 
notion that sponsors’ profits could be affected by the performance of underlying mortgages. However, 
the former predicts that the sponsor-servicer affiliation effects should disappear as soon as a sufficient 
number of mortgages default and the value for the first loss position held by the sponsor becomes 
zero. In contrast, under the latter argument, the affiliation effects are expected to increase after the 
most junior tranche dries up, which prompts sponsors to better service the mortgages in their trusts.  
 















































































































The dry-up is a key event in the examination of sponsors’ incentives to take care of mortgages in their 
trusts. Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of dry-up dates. The vertical axis shows the number of deals 
whose equity tranche has dried up. Across all securitizations, the loss from defaulted loans eroded the 
bottom floor of the securitization tower and reached the mezzanine tranches the most often in the 
third quarter of 2008. In particular, there are 87 deals whose bottom tranches were wiped out in 
August 2008. 
Figure 3.7 shows the portion of borrowers who fall into MDQ around the time when the most junior 
tranche dries up. The solid and dotted lines indicate the MDQ rates respectively for the mortgages 
whose servicers are unaffiliated and affiliated with the sponsors. The horizontal axis is associated with 
the number of months around the date when the value for equity tranche drops to zero. The difference 
in MDQ rate between externally and internally serviced mortgages is amplified after the dry-up date. 
MDQ rate is only slightly higher for external mortgages than for internal ones (0.53%) 24 months 
before the dry-up date, however the difference in MDQ rate increases to 3.7% approximately six 
months after the dry-up date, which is more consistent with the reputation hypothesis.  
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It could be argued that the dynamics of affiliation effects around the dry-up date may be driven by 
the difference in ex-ante risk characteristics for each mortgage or macro environment mortgagors 
face. Therefore, I examine how the effects of affiliation vary across time since the dry-up date, 
controlling for loan attributes and macro variables.  
1(𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝐷𝑄 |𝑡) =  𝛼× 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖  + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4) 
In the regression equation (4), the dependent variable is whether the mortgage experiences MDQ in 
𝑡th month from the dry-up (𝑡 = 0). The vector of underwriting characteristics for mortgage 𝑖 is 
denoted as 𝑋𝑖. A vector of macro variables is 𝑀𝑖𝑡 including percentage change in unemployment 
rate and FHFA house price index for the property location between origination and 𝑡th month from 
𝑡 = 0.  
In addition to estimating a regression for the dry-up date, I repeat the estimation for 12 regressions 
for each month between six months before and after 𝑡 = 0, which is presented in Table 3.5. Similar 
to previous models, the sample is restricted to the mortgages securitized in 2006. The regressions are 
separately run for each month around the dry-up date when the most junior tranche was exhausted 
for a deal. T=0 is the tranche dry-up date. 𝑇 = −𝑡 means 𝑡  months before the dry-up date while 
the number of months after the dry-up date is given by 𝑇 = 𝑡. Loan vintage and servicer fixed 
effects are controlled for all 13 regressions. Standard errors are clustered by ZIP codes. As suggested 
in my first essay, mortgage underwriting characteristics may be selectively reported in the loan-level 
dataset. Hence, to minimize the number of mortgages dropped from the sample, I keep all 
mortgages who are missing some attributes by classifying those in the “unknown” categories. 
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Table 3.5. Loan-level MDQ regressions: The effect of servicer-sponsor affiliation and the value of the most junior tranche 
Dependent variable=1 if the mortgage is mildly delinquent (30 or 60 days in arrears but not followed by 90+days in arrears or by foreclosure); 0 otherwise. 
  -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Servicer = sponsor (d) -0.0104*** -0.0105*** -0.0128*** -0.0157*** -0.0178*** -0.0200*** -0.0229*** -0.0245*** -0.0253*** -0.0271*** -0.0082*** -0.0276*** -0.0275*** 
 (-14.070) (-13.631) (-15.775) (-18.867) (-20.174) (-22.257) (-24.734) (-25.225) (-25.714) (-26.835) (-7.200) (-26.918) (-26.241) 
FICO < 620 (d) 0.1479*** 0.1497*** 0.1565*** 0.1581*** 0.1605*** 0.1644*** 0.1694*** 0.1744*** 0.1759*** 0.1753*** 0.1720*** 0.1766*** 0.1761*** 
 (142.379) (140.488) (141.431) (139.261) (137.318) (136.501) (139.552) (139.653) (137.123) (135.561) (131.815) (134.380) (130.946) 
620 ≤ FICO < 680 (d) 0.0465*** 0.0485*** 0.0522*** 0.0539*** 0.0562*** 0.0587*** 0.0609*** 0.0640*** 0.0666*** 0.0673*** 0.0687*** 0.0701*** 0.0710*** 
 (79.085) (80.634) (84.628) (84.306) (85.242) (83.755) (86.163) (87.215) (88.134) (86.687) (87.607) (87.915) (87.308) 
FICO unknown (d) 0.0521*** 0.0512*** 0.0584*** 0.0547*** 0.0571*** 0.0587*** 0.0605*** 0.0582*** 0.0626*** 0.0602*** 0.0618*** 0.0634*** 0.0629*** 
 (58.795) (56.645) (62.581) (57.334) (58.149) (56.416) (57.965) (53.341) (55.926) (51.649) (53.359) (53.183) (52.775) 
80 ≤ LTV < 100 (d) 0.0092*** 0.0095*** 0.0117*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0133*** 0.0145*** 0.0138*** 0.0145*** 0.0160*** 0.0176*** 0.0169*** 0.0171*** 
 (17.847) (18.091) (21.363) (21.986) (21.955) (22.869) (24.605) (22.541) (23.052) (24.973) (26.393) (25.301) (25.137) 
LTV ≥ 100 (d) 0.0064*** 0.0037*** 0.0112*** 0.0132*** 0.0114*** 0.0044*** 0.0118*** 0.0044*** 0.0079*** 0.0081*** 0.0092*** 0.0095*** 0.0111*** 
 (5.877) (3.297) (9.680) (11.261) (9.281) (3.536) (9.329) (3.411) (5.960) (5.879) (6.428) (6.771) (7.816) 
LTV unknown (d) -0.0080 -0.0031 0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0056 -0.0176** 0.0018 0.0022 -0.0023 0.0117 0.0153 0.0224* 0.0206* 
 (-1.195) (-0.453) (0.155) (-0.310) (-0.710) (-2.196) (0.202) (0.239) (-0.229) (1.083) (1.379) (1.940) (1.684) 
Second lien (d) -0.0129*** -0.0101*** -0.0253*** -0.0248*** -0.0230*** -0.0058*** -0.0243*** -0.0116*** -0.0216*** -0.0224*** -0.0224*** -0.0236*** -0.0251*** 
 (-14.561) (-11.076) (-28.702) (-27.673) (-24.649) (-5.770) (-24.790) (-10.844) (-20.110) (-20.165) (-19.216) (-20.257) (-21.872) 
Lien unknown (d) 0.0051*** 0.0028*** 0.0081*** 0.0068*** 0.0090*** 0.0147*** 0.0097*** 0.0076*** 0.0069*** 0.0144*** 0.0037*** 0.0088*** 0.0114*** 
 (5.874) (3.147) (8.740) (7.118) (9.199) (14.228) (9.391) (7.118) (6.403) (12.693) (3.166) (7.542) (9.410) 
ARM (d) 0.0134*** 0.0149*** 0.0163*** 0.0164*** 0.0184*** 0.0176*** 0.0234*** 0.0240*** 0.0265*** 0.0271*** 0.0253*** 0.0267*** 0.0264*** 
 (25.768) (27.965) (29.555) (29.410) (31.658) (29.952) (38.619) (37.831) (40.499) (39.872) (36.440) (38.035) (37.217) 
Low doc (d) 0.0054*** 0.0046*** 0.0072*** 0.0064*** 0.0062*** 0.0096*** 0.0062*** 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0059*** 0.0068*** 0.0087*** 0.0093*** 
 (8.938) (7.272) (11.204) (9.625) (9.066) (13.558) (8.721) (8.703) (8.527) (7.573) (8.504) (10.821) (11.243) 
Doc unknown (d) 0.0262*** 0.0286*** 0.0212*** 0.0186*** 0.0193*** 0.0151*** 0.0182*** 0.0307*** 0.0201*** 0.0231*** 0.0184*** 0.0235*** 0.0220*** 
 (29.035) (31.046) (23.555) (20.167) (20.088) (15.158) (18.049) (28.271) (18.531) (20.481) (16.302) (20.291) (18.853) 
%∆ Unemployment rate 0.0209*** 0.0222*** 0.0196*** 0.0217*** 0.0192*** 0.0144*** 0.0127*** 0.0128*** 0.0120*** 0.0063*** 0.0077*** 0.0041*** 0.0028*** 
 (23.504) (25.415) (22.827) (25.365) (23.281) (18.385) (16.495) (16.600) (15.458) (8.233) (10.017) (5.391) (3.610) 
%∆ House price index -0.0047 -0.0081*** -0.0086*** -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0087*** -0.0174*** -0.0187*** -0.0164*** -0.0275*** -0.0268*** -0.0331*** -0.0338*** 
  (-1.615) (-2.843) (-2.960) (-0.800) (-1.246) (-2.933) (-5.894) (-6.169) (-5.465) (-8.986) (-8.612) (-10.789) (-10.821) 
Loan vintage FE (d) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Servicer FE (d) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
adj. R-sq 0.054 0.052 0.058 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.059 0.059 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060 




In general, the affiliation between servicer and sponsor decreases the likelihood of MDQ. The negative 
effects of affiliation nearly monotonically increase from −1.04% to −2.76% during the 13 months around 
the dry-up date. If sponsors’ interest in loan performance was determined only by their first loss positions, 
the affiliation effects should decline or disappear after the value of residual tranche became zero. In 
contrast, my result shows that as residual value declines and goes to zero, the effect of affiliation between 
the sponsor and the servicer becomes more negative. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
sponsors may be incentivized to actively manage the performance of collateralized mortgages through 
affiliated servicers due to their desire to maintain reputational capital.  
MDQ may occur for a variety of reasons other than credit quality of mortgages. Hence, ex-ante risk factors 
may exert mixed influences on the likelihood of MDQ. Mortgages experience MDQ more often when their 
borrowers have lower FICO scores, and when the mortgages were closed with adjustable interest rate, low 
documentation, and when the property locations were exposed to adverse economic conditions with rising 
unemployment and declining house prices.  
However, MDQ is the most likely for mortgages with an intermediate level of LTV and senior lien status. 
This presumably implies the possibility that mortgagors with capacity to continuously pay late fees could be 
often induced to make payment mistakes. 
My results are highly robust across different specifications and different set of samples including the group 
of mortgages serviced only by sponsors with servicing platforms. The results consistently show that the 
negative relation between the sponsor-servicer affiliations and the probability of MDQ is amplified as the 
junior tranches dry up whether servicer effects are controlled, and whether junior-lien mortgages are 




There may be substantial differences between traditional mortgage lending models where the financial 
intermediary functions are vertically integrated and the securitized banking model where transaction parties 
are not necessarily affiliated. In particular, sponsor affiliations have been shown to significantly affect 
securitization outcomes by a large body of literature (Demiroglu and James, 2012; Titman and Tsyplakov. 
2010). Most of the previous studies about sponsor affiliations assumed that sponsors have “skin in the 
game,” however to date none have examined why sponsors should be concerned about the performance of 
mortgages they already sold off into securitizations. In this paper, I provide the evidence on the source of 
sponsors’ “skin in the game.” Using large loan-level datasets, I show that servicing quality increases when 
the mortgage is serviced by the sponsor. More importantly, the relationship between sponsor-servicer 
affiliation and the likelihood of MDQ is stronger after the most junior tranche has dried up. Based on these 
two sets of results, I conclude that sponsors do have “skin in the game” stemming from financial incentives 
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APPENDIX. MISSING RATE BY DATA CATEGORY AND CLEANSING  
Data category Raw item missing rate   Cleansed item missing rate 
ARM Adjustment Factor ArmRoundCd 67.05%    
 ArmRoundDesc 75.04%    
 ArmRoundFactor 64.47%    
  NoArmLookBkDays 63.21%       
ARM Conversion ArmConvertCd 81.96%   ArmConvertStatusInd 49.57% 
ARM Index IndexCd 45.29%    
 IndexShortName 61.99%    
  OrigIdxValue 38.16%       
ARM Payment FirstPaymtAdjDt 70.70%  FirstPaymtAdjDtCalc 65.21% 
 PayAdjFreq 17.83%    
  PeriodicPayCapPct 32.64%       
ARM Rate Adjustment IntRtAdjFreq 17.44%   IntRtAdjFreqCalc 17.44% 
ARM Rate Cap/Floor ArmRtLifeCap 56.84%  ArmRtLifeCapCalc 56.89% 
 LifeMaxIntRtCeiling 15.67%    
 LifeRtFloor 17.82%  LifeRtFloorCalc 17.91% 
 PeriodicRtCap 17.95%    
  PeriodicRtFloor 95.40%       
ARM Rate Initial Period FirstPerRtCap 78.14%    
 FirstRtAdjDt 64.95%  FirstRtAdjDtCalc 61.08% 
  InitialFixedRtPer 99.94%   InitialFixedRtPerCalc 64.14% 
Credit Documentation DocCd 73.33%    
 DocCdDesc 75.82%    
 DocType 40.23%  DocTypeSummary 40.33% 
 DocTypeDesc 38.82%    
  NoRatioID 97.95%       
Credit Equity CombinedLienLTV 24.62%  CombinedLienLTVCalc 47.26% 
 LienStatus 27.04%  LienType 26.02% 
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 OrigLTVRatio 8.30%  OrigLTVRatioCalc 6.35% 
 PledgedAssetAmt 92.85%    
  PledgedAssetMrtgInd 59.51%   PledgedAssetMortgageStatusInd 59.51% 
Credit FICO FicoRawScore 58.87%    
  FicoScoreOrigination 22.70%   FicoScoreOriginationCalc 29.30% 
Credit MI LenderPaidMIFlag 90.08%  LenderPaidMIStatusInd 90.08% 
    MIStatusInd 0.00% 
 PMICovPct 50.75%  PMICovPctCalc 50.75% 
 PMIIndicator 37.71%    
 PMIInsurerCd 38.41%    
 PMIInsurerName 81.12%    
  PMIPercentage 91.70%       
Credit Rating CreditGrade 84.76%   CreditCatLoan 10.65% 
Duration FundingDtTm 89.92%    
 MaturityDt 7.50%  MaturityDtCalc 3.41% 
 OrigDtNoteDt 22.44%  OrigDtNoteDtCalc 1.37% 
 OriginalTerm 5.28%  OriginalTermCalc 3.38% 
  AmortizationTerm 67.43%   AmortizationTermCalc 8.34% 
Loan Balance IssuanceBal 45.14%  IssuanceBalCalc 14.19% 
 OriginalBal 0.75%  OriginalBalCalc 0.56% 
 SaleBalance 39.16%    
  SchedLnBalClosing 89.69%       
Loan Feature I/O IntOnlyEndDt 74.56%    
 IntOnlyOrigTerm 44.22%  IntOnlyOrigTermCalc 43.95% 
  IOFlag 44.05%   IOStatusInd 43.39% 
Loan Feature NegAm ArmNegAmortCap 55.77%  ArmNegAmortCapCalc 62.92% 
 HELOCDrawPeriodYrs 99.91%    
 NegAmortCd 75.42%  NegAmStatusInd 94.79% 
  NegAmPctg 88.67%       
Loan Feature Teaser ArmTeaserPeriod 70.72%    
111 
 
 PayTeaserind 70.90%    
  PayTeaserPeriod 70.90%       
Loan Origination ChannelCd 94.99%    
 ChannelDesc 95.00%    
 OriginatorCd 99.87%    
 OriginatorName 84.60%    
  Seller 99.87%       
Loan Type ARMInd 60.80%  IntRtTypeSummary 3.98% 
 LoanType 26.22%    
 LoanTypeDesc 26.25%    
 NoteDesc 71.55%    
 NoteType 64.24%    
 ProductDesc 65.70%    
 ProductTypeCd 58.00%    
 ProgramCd 93.12%    
  ProgramName 93.88%       
Loan Type Balloon BalloonInd 63.03%   BalloonStatusInd 61.73% 
Loan Type Hybrid       HybridARMInd 87.33% 
Loan Type Option ARM       OptionARMInd 94.79% 
Loan Type Heloc        HelocInd 98.35% 
Occupancy LeaseholdID 97.66%    
 OccStatusCd 9.60%    
  OccStatusDesc 9.07%   OccType 10.42% 
Payment FirstPaymtDt 8.82%  FirstPaymtDtCalc 4.77% 
 FirstPrinPaymtDt 90.10%    
 IssuePI 14.01%    
 SchedPIAtIssuance 89.26%    
        OrigPI 97.49% 
Prepayment Penalty PayoffPnltyType 94.85%    
 PrepayPenaltyAmt 39.12%    
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 PrepayPenaltyEndDt 81.66%    
 PrepayPenaltyFlag 73.15%    
 PrepayPenaltyInd 31.97%  PrepayPenaltyStatusInd 63.24% 
  PrepayPenaltyWaived 70.94%       
Property Location PropertyCity 13.97%  PropertyCityCalc 0.00% 
 PropertyCounty 84.62%  PropertyCountyCalc 0.00% 
 PropertyCountyCd 87.34%    
 PropertyStAddress 96.69%    
 PropertyState 4.82%  PropertyStateCalc 0.00% 
  PropertyZipCd 3.30%   PropertyZipCdCalc 0.00% 
Property Type NoUnits 76.95%  NoUnitsCalc 76.96% 
 PropertyTypeCd 8.59%    
  PropertyTypeDesc 8.40%   PropType 8.67% 
Property Value ApprslTypeDesc 96.21%    
 CurAppraisalValue 97.54%    
  OrigAppraisalValue 10.35%   OrigAppraisalValueCalc 18.50% 
Purpose PurposeCd 12.07%    
 PurposeDesc 12.17%  PurposeType 13.82% 
  RelocationInd 95.20%       
Rate FixedRetYldRt 58.91%    
 InitialIntRt 66.17%  InitialIntRtCalc 0.22% 
 IntRtAtIssuance 85.86%  IssuanceRtCalc 94.16% 
 Margin 15.59%  MarginCalc 15.59% 
 NoteRateAdjForLPMI 90.02%    
  OrigIntRt 0.47%   OrigIntRtCalc 5.49% 
Servicing EscrowBal 90.59%    
 MasterServFee 41.94%    
 ServicerCd 73.63%    
 ServicerName 11.74%  ServicerNameCalc 12.38% 
 ServicerNo 69.48%    
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  ServicingFee 27.05%       
Loan Modifications    NoMods 1.38% 
        ModLatestDt 90.58% 
Key Events    FirstActivityDt 0.00% 
    LatestActivityDt 0.00% 
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